Malankara Jacobite Syrian Christian Network

Minority Judgment by the Supreme Court Of India 1995

PETITIONER: MOST. REV. P.M.A. METROPOLITAN & ORS.

             Vs.

RESPONDENT: MORAN MAR MARTHOMA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/06/1995

BENCH:

SAHAI, R.M. (J)

BENCH:

SAHAI, R.M. (J)

JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

SEN, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 2001  1995 SCC  Supl.  (4) 286  JT 1995 (5)  1 1995 SCALE  (4)1

J U D G E M E N T

R.M. Sahai.J.

When Lord Jesus Christ was asked by a young man who was possessed of  property what was the road to heaven, the Holy Bible records it in Chapter19of the New Testament – the Gospel According to St. Mathew thus.

"16. And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what  good thing shall I  do, that I  may   have  eternal  life?

17. And  he said unto him,  Why callest thou me good? there  is none good but  one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep  the commandments.

18.  He  saith unto  him, Which? Jesus said, Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt   not commit  adultery, Thou  shalt not  steal, Thou shalt not  bear false witness,

19. Honour thy father and thy mother: and, Thou shalt love thy  neighbour as thyself.

 20. The young man saith unto him, All these things have  I kept  from  my youth up: what lack I yet?

21. Jesus  said unto him, if thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that  thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.

22. But  when the  young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions".

Turning 'away  sorrowful', is  the long and short of  this litigation between two rival  groups of  Jacobite Christian Community of  Malabar which  has been going on for more than hundred years apparently for religious and spiritual supremacy over the Church  but really for administrative control and  temporal powers  over vast  assets  which  have accumulated out of 3000  star pagodas  created in  Trust in 1808 for  charitable purposes  by one  Moran Mar Marthoma VI popularly called  `Dionysius the  Great'. This  is the third round between  the parties  in this  court, the  two earlier being in 1954 and 1959. While deciding the appeal in 1959 this Court  had observed  that the dispute had been going on for a  considerable length  of time which has brought in its train protracted  litigation involving         ruinous costs.  The effect of  the decision    was  that  for   sometime  both  the parties resolved their differences by mutual adjustment, but `those who  hoped -  fondly, as events have proved, that the decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Moran  Mar  Basselios Catholicos v.  Thukalan Paulo  Avira & others (1958  K.L.T. 721) =  AIR 1959  SC  31  and  the  reported  reconciliation following upon  that decision  would give the quietus to the litigation, prolific,  prolonged and ruinous, arising out of the faction  in the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church between what is  known as  the Patriarch's Party on the one hand and what is known as the Catholicos' Party on the other, counted without the  resourcefulness of   those entrenched  in and of those covetous  of positions  of power,  and we dare say, of profit, and  of those who, for one reason or another, have a vested interest   in the   continuance of the dispute,' [Raman Nayar, J.  in Appearl  Suit No.  269 of 1960 decided on 3rd April 1964].

How the  much negotiated  peace and quiet arrived at by written adjustments  worked out by issuing letters from both the groups  was shaken even before expiry of 15 years since the judgement was delivered by this Court in September, 1958 and what  leld to  filing of  numerous suits  eight of which were consolidated  by the  Additional. District.  Judge   but

were heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, as  they were transferred under orders of this Court, and were  ultimately decided  in appeal and cross objections by the   Division Bench  giving rise  to    these   appeals and various legal    issues   including  whether  the   suit  under Section 9  of the  Code of Civil Procedure was maintainable, effect of  Places of  Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 and whether  the decision  in  earlier      suit  filed  by  the appelants  operated   as  res judicata  can     be,  better, appreciated if    the history how the Malankara Church came to be established,  what is  its nature  and how the two groups Patriarch of  Antioch  and  Catholicos   came  to  be  formed leading  to  internecine  struggle  and     litigation  may  be noticed in brief. The adversorial duel between the two rival groups has  assumed so    much of  publicity that it has found place even  in the  Encyclopedia  of  Religion.    It  may  be prefaced  with   brief    observations   about  the  Christian religion and the Church.

Religion is founded on faith and belief. Faith emanates from  conscience  and  belief  is  result  of  teaching and learning.  Christianity     is  `a    religion  that     traces  its origins to  Jesus of  Nazareth, whom  it affirms  to be     the chosen one (Christ) of God' [Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 5, Page 693]. `It  is embodied  both in  its principles and precepts in  the Scriptures  of the  Old and New Testaments, which all denominations of Christians believe to be a Divine revelation, and  the  only  rule  of  faith  and  obedience' [Faiths of the World by James Gardner, Volume 1, P. 516]. It is `a  historical religion.  It locates within the events of human history  both the redemption  it  promises,  and the revelation to  which it    lays claim'  [The  Encyclopedia  of Religion, Volume  3, p. 348]. `In its origin Christianity is Eastern rather   than Western.  Jesus was  a Palestinian Jew, and during  the early,     formative centuries  of the church's life the Greek and Syriac East was both numerically stronger and  intellectually  more  creative  than  the  Latin  West. Christianity came  to India many centuries before it reached Europe as  it is  believed  that  St.  Thomas,   one  of  the original apostles  of Jesus Christ, visited India in 56 A.D. and found  the first  Christian     settlement  in    the  South' [Religion in India by Dr. Karan Singh]. In A.D. 37 Apostolic See at   Antioch was  established by  St. Peter   to whom  the stewardship of Church was entrusted by Lord Jesus Christ. It took root  in Kerala  within 20  years of  the epoch  making events   in  Jerusalem,    the  crucifixion,  resurrection      and ascension of  the Lord   Jesus Christ. St. Thomas, one of the 12 apostles  of Jesus Christ visited India in A.D. 51/52 and established 7  Churches in  the Malayalam  speaking parts of South India.  They  are  known as  Malankara  Jacobite  (or orthodox)  Syrian   Church,  "Malankara"   means  "Malayalam speaking" `The  two Syrian  Orthodox Churches  in Syria  and India, along  with the     Egyptian  (Coptic),  Ethiopian,  and Armenian Churches,  belong  to the  group  of    Ancient,  or Oriental Orthodox,  Churches, wrongly  called "monophysite". Their Christology  is essentially  the same  as that  of the Eastern   Orthodox    related     to   the   patriarchate   of Constantinople. They  affirm the perfect humanity as well as the perfect divinity of Christ, inseparably and unconfusedly united in  the divine-human  nature of the person of Christ' [Encyclopedia of Religion, Volume 14, page 227].

 Jacobite Church  is, `a  name which  the Syrian  Church assumes to itself. When the Syrian Churches are interrogated as to  the reason of this name they usually allege that they are the  descendants of Jacob' [Faiths of the World by James Gardner, Volume  II). `Known to the West as Jacobites (after Jacob Baradeus,  c. 500-578,  the reorganiser  of  the     West Syrians and  Egyptians in  the sixth  century),     the  Syrian Orthodox Church         is found  mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, India,   the United  States, the   Federal Republic of Germany, and  Sweden. In 1985 the total number of Jacobites, including 1.8  million Indians,     was about 2 million, in two separate jurisdictions     -- one with Patriarch Ignatius Zakka as head in Damascus, Syria and the other with Catholicos Mar Thoma  Mathews  I  as  head,  in  Kottayam,  Kerala,  India' [Encyclopedia of  Religion, Volume  14 p.  227].  The   word `church' refers   both to  the Christian    religious community and  to the building used for Christian worship' [Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 5 page 739). The Christian religion is  one, but, `Christians differ  greatly in their beliefs about the nature of the church' [Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 5, page 739] which  was,  `originally applied in  the classical  period to an official assembly of citizens....   In the  Septuagint  translation of  the   Old Testament (3rd-2nd centuries B.C.) the term ecclesia is used for the  general assembly  of the  Jewish people  especially when gathered for a  religious purpose  such as hearing the Law (Deut.  ix, 10, xviii, 16; etc.) In the New Testament it is used of the whole body of believing Christians throughout the world  (e.g., Matt.xvi,  18),  of  the  believers  in  a particular  area   (e.g.  Acts       v,  11)  and  also  of the congregation meeting  in a  particular house  - the  "house-church")' [Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 5 page 739]. `The four marks or characteristics by which the church is said to be distinguished  are recited  in the creed - holy, catholic and apostolic'.

Coming to   the history of Jacobite Syrian Church it is, both, fascinating  and eventful.  The long period stretching from A.D.  51-52 can  be conveniently  divided in three one, the  religious     and  the  formative  period  which  saw  the foundation of  the church and the vicissitudes through which it passed. The second can be said to be the golden period, a period of  affluence and prosperity, in which the church not only acquired assets and became financially rich but is also marked for  administrative efficiency  imparted by different metropolitans who  were consecrated  from time to time. But wealth breeds  dissension, disharmony  and  discontent. And that is   the unfortunate  story of the last period beginning from 1879.  More than  100 years  have rolled  by since then when the  storm of  strife for supremacy over the Church was taken to  courts but the dust has not settled down till now. The first two periods have been described by the Royal Court of Appeal  as, `Grand Periods, the first commencing from the foundation of  the church  and ending  with the overthrow of the Portuguese  power in  India sometime  in 1663,  and the second period  commencing  from  that  year  or  1665 and extending to  the period when the famous Mulunthuruthy Synod was held  in 1876  which was  remarkable for  more than  one reason, including   the  one  which  led  to  struggle  for spiritual supremacy and administrative control over temporal matters of  the Church   through the  courts. The events till 1876 have  been discussed in great detail in the judgment of the Royal  Court of Appeal. The period thereafter commencing from the  last quarter of 19th century and beginning of 20th century is remarkable for creation of Catholicate of East in this country  and framing  of Constitution  by the Malankara Association. All  this is  discussed in      Moran Mar Basselios (supra).

Religious spirit  was dominant  in  the  first  period. Every move  was religion  oriented. The keen desire to delve more  and  more  in  spiritual  than  temporal   matters was exhibited from   time to  time. Three  important events   took place during this long period. Although each was distance in time from  the other but everyone was significant in its own way in  shaping the  future of     the Church.  The  first,  of course, was  establishing of  the Church  by St.  Thomas who exercised great influence and    ordained two  men as  Arch - Deacons, one from each of the two respectable families, that is, Sankarapuri  and Pakalomattiom. In A.D. 200 the devotees had  written   to  Demetrius   the  Bishop   of     Alexandria, requesting him   to send a teacher,  to instruct them in the doctrines relating  to the  beliefs in Christ. The second in the sequence was significant not for the Syrian Church only, but for  the entire  Christian community.  It was  an  epoch making event.  The first eccuminical council was held in 325 A.D. at Nicea. Priests  and  prelates    from  all  parts  of Christendom were invited. Representatives of all dioceses in the Christian  world attended the Synod. Christians of India were represented  by their  bishop or  metropolitan known as Johannes, metropolitan  of Persia  and   India.    The  council among other  matters was  concerned with matters relating to the revival  and establishment    of Christianity, revision of the scriptures    and framing a Code of faith and rituals. But the most important decision, of far reaching consequence was that the  ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Christandom was settled under  four ecclesiastical heads and four Patriarchs were  appointed  over  four  sees  -  Rome,  Constantinople, Alexandria and Antioch. India was placed under the Patriarch of Antioch.  The other   decision taken   was that  the  great metropolitan of the East was proclaimed as the Catholicos of the East.  It was laid down that the Catholicos appointed at Tigris (Baghdad)  shall manage  the affairs  of the  Eastern churches subject to that Patriarch of Antioch was common and could  exercise  all  the  functions  of  Patriarchs.  These decisions  were enforced  and  the  Patriarch    of  Antiouch started taking    action upon it. Till about A.D. 1599 Bishops (who were  called `episcopas' or Metropolitans) were deputed to Malabar  from time to time by the Catholicate of the East in Persia  and by  the Patriarchs  of other Eastern Churches for  discharging  spiritual  functions  like  ordination  of priests in  the Malankara  Church. But   all other  functions were carried  on by the Indian born ecclesiastical dignitary known as the 'Arch-Deacon' who was not possessed of the full spiritual grace of a Bishop.

The next  or the  third  important      event   during   this period was  the famous Koonan Cross  Oath  at  Muttancherry sometime in  1664. It  was final  break away  from the Roman Catholic influence  which was  being forcibly imposed on the followers of Syrian Church. Between 1599 to 1654 A.D. due to influence of  the Portuguese  political power  in  the East Coast of  India, the  Malankara Church   was  compelled  to accept Roman  Catholic supremacy  i.e., the supremacy of the Pope  of   Rome.  The  tough  resistance  from  the  Syrian Christians resulted  in adopting  repressive measures by the Portuguese. The climax was reached in 1599 in the so-called Synod of Diamper. Books of the Syrians Christians were burnt and destroyed.  All traces  of Apostolic succession in their church  were   obliterated.  The   Portuguese  arrested   Mar Ignatius the  Patriarch, at Mylapore, brought him in fetters to Cochin  on way  to Rome  and ultimately  he mysteriously disappeared believed  to have  been killed either by drowing or  burning.   This  enraged   the  Syrians.   They  met  at Mattancherry, took  the famous oath  at  Koonan  Cross  and resolved that  they shall  never again unite themselves with the Portuguese  who had  without any  scruple or fear of God murdered their  holy Patriarch. This was in 1664. This event marks an epoch in the history of the Syrian church. It split the followers  in two Punthenkoor and Palayakoor. The former became Jacobite  Syrians following the creed of Patriarch of Antioch and  the latter   Roman Syrians  following the  Roman creed of  the Pope  of Rome.  The  Puthenkoor  people  after meeting at  Mattancherry came  to  Alengad  Church  and,  in obedience to  the Station  of Mar Ignatius consecrated Arch- Deacon Thoma with the title of Mar Thoma Metran.

With this commenced the  second period.  It, too, like the first  was marked  by few  important events, which again have played  vital role in the destiny of the Syrian Church. The first  was the  ordination in 1654 of Mar Thoma Mitra as Marthoma I.  Its significance  lay as  he  was    ordained  as Metropolitan  of  Malankara  by the  Patriarch   of  Antioch through his  delegate. From  1665  onwards,  therefore, the ordination of  the Malankara  Metropolitan was carried on by the delegate  of Patriarch  of Antioch. The second important event took  place in  A.D. 1808  when a trust for charitable purposes was  created by the then Malankara Metropolitan Mar Thoma VI  (Dionysius the  Great) by  investing in perpetuity 3000 Star Pagodas (equivalent to Rs.10,500/-) in the British Treasury on  interest @ 8% per annum. During this period the Church Mission  Society, a  missionary society of Protestant with   headquarters in London, had come to Malabar  and collaborated with  the  Malankara  Church  and had  jointly acquired  some properties.  Disputes    arose  between this Society and  the  Malankara  Church  with  regard  to  those properties and  also to  the beneficial interest arising out of the    charitable deposit  of 3000  Star Pagodas which were referred to arbitration and were settled by what is known as the `Cochin  Award of  1840', which  was the third important event of  this period.   This Award  divided  the  properties between the two bodies allotting among other items 3000 star Pagodas to  the Malankara Church. The properties so allotted to the Malankara  Church  were as per  the  Award to be administered  by   the    trustees  i.e.,    

(1)  the  Malankara Metropolitan,

 (2)  a priest-trustee  and

(3)  a lay-trustee.

The effect  of the Cochin Award was that the dispute between the Mission  Society and  the Syrian  Church came to an end. But it appears between 1808 and 1840 vast assets had been acquired with  the trust created by Dionysius VI. These were controlled and administered by the person who was the head of the Church. Therefore, even though one Cheppat Dionysius, a locally  ordained Metropolitan  was in  office, one Mathew Athanasius went to Syria in 1840 and got himself ordained as Metropolitan by the Patriarch of Antioch. Thus the seeds of strife were sown.

If 1654  is  significant for  commencement  of  local ordination by the delegate of Patriarch of Antioch then 1840 marked the  beginning of emergence of struggle for supremacy over the  Church between  locally ordained  Metropolitan and the one ordained by the Patriarch of Antioch. Disputes arose between M.  Athanasius and  C. Dionysius.  To settle  it the Patriarch of  Antioch sent  one Mar  Yayakim Koorilos as his delegate. But  Koorilose adopted a novel way of settling the dispute by excommunicating Mathew and appointing himself  as the Malankara  Metropolitan. Cheppat  Dionysius withdrew  in favour of  Mar Koorilos,  but Mathew Athanasius persisted in his claim.  When these   disputes came  to the  knowledge  of Travancore Government  it appointed in 1848 a Tribunal known as  the  `Quilon  Committee'  to  settle  the  dispute.  The Committee held in favour  of M. Athanasius and he took over charge  as   the  Malankara  Metropolitan.  It    appears the Committee preferred Patriarch ordained Metropolitan over the local ordained   as spiritual spirit was flowing, still, from Antioch. Even  though the Quilon Committee decided in favour of Athanasius  and he  took over  charge of the property but the local  people were not satisfied, therefore, they appear to have persuaded one Joseph Dionysius  to go to Syria and get himself  ordained as  Malankara  Metropolitan.  In   1865 Joseph Dionysius  was ordained  as the   popular feeling  was that M. Athanasius   was leaning  towards protestainism. M. Athanasius however  refused  to lay  down  the  office.  He continued as metropolitan and towards the end of his life he ordained his  nephew or brother one Thomas Athanasius who on death of his  brother assumed the office.

This bitter strife between the two forced the Patriarch to come to Malabar, as the conduct of Athanasius amounted to denial of  his authority,  and call  a meeting of accredited representatives of  all the  Churches  at  Mulunthuruthy  in 1876. It  is popularly     known as `Mulanthuruthy Synod'. This is the    most important event not only of this period, but in the entire history of Syrian Church. Many resolutions taking important decisions  were adopted.  At the  Synod the Syrian Christian  Association   popularly  called   the  `Malankara Association'  was  formed  to  manage  the  affairs  of    the Churches and  the community.  It constituted  the  Malankara Metropolitan  as   the    ex-officio   President     and   three representatives from each Church. A Managing Committee of 24 was  to   be  Standing Working  Committee   of  the   said Association. The  Synod affirmed  the orthodox faith. Joseph Dionysius who had earlier been ordained by the Patriarch was accepted as  the Malankara  Metropolitan. Whether it was re-assertion of supremacy of Patriarch or not cannot be said as the  election  of  Joseph  Dionysius  was  preceded  by  two factors, one,  that he  had  been  persuaded  by  the  local people, earlier,   and    he  got  himself  ordained  by    the Patriarch and second that Thomas Athanasius was a nominee of his brother  and he  had not been elected by the people. But it, undoubtedly,  shows that  the spiritual  domination     was still predominant. However, Thomas Athanasius challenged the ordination by Patriarch and claimed equal status. This could not have  been agreed to by anyone as the spiritual faith in the Patriarch prevented the people in Malabar to acknowledge a person  as Metropolitan who was not ordained either by the Patriarch  or  his  nominee.  However,   Thomas Athanasius refused to  hand over  the property and Joseph Dionysius was left with no option except to approach the court.

Thus commenced the third  period.  If the first two periods were great for  the growth  and development of the Church then  the third described as the, `turbulent period' is unique  not for  any development  of   religion,  but     for providing stability  to the Church by creating a Catholicate of the    East for  India, Burma   and Ceylon  at Malankara and adopting  a Constitution  for     the  administration  of    the Church. The  period unfortunately witnessed division amongst followers of  the  Church  who  came  to  be  known  as the `Patriarch' and  the `Catholico',  mainly because  there was disturbance in   Antioch itself     and  two  of  the Patriarch claimed to  exercise the  prerogative of  being Patriarch of Antioch at the same time. Within a span of fifty years, five suits were  filed, the      first known  as, `Seminary Suit', in 1879, the second as `Arthat case' in 1899, the third in 1913 which became  famous as `Vattipanam case' the fourth in 1938 known as  `Samudayam Suit' and fifth and last in 1974 giving rise to   these appeals.  The first  was filed by a Patriarch ordained and  duly  elected  Metropolitan  at  Mulanthuruthy Synod  for   recovery    of   property    against   nominated Metropolitan, whereas  the second  was filed for enforcement of the    order passed in earlier suit as some of the parishes were denying  the authority  of the Metropolitan to exercise spiritual and  temporal control   over them. The third was an interpleader suit  by Secretary   of State  for India  due to formation of  two groups  laying rival     claims   against  the assets. All  the three      suits  were  decided  in  favour  of Catholico group. Therefore, the fourth suit was filed by the Patriarch group against Catholicos  claiming that  they had become heretics and had separated from the Church. This too was decided  in favour  of Catholicos. But the fifth and the last suits  were filed by the Catholicos for reasons which shall be  explained later.  In the Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 14,  P. 226,  the history from creation of Patriarch of Antioch till  1970 is  traced thus,  The church     in  Antioch became practically the mother church of Christendom......The leadership  of    the  Syrian  church  was  decimated  by the Diocletian  persecution  that  broke  out  around  304.  The persecution  also   led   to   the  development of Syrian monasticism  through   the  Christians who  fled  into   the wilderness. The spirit of  Syrian Christianity was  shaped more by worship, martyrdom, and  monasticism  than  by theology......In the  twelfth century  the Syrian church was at the peak of its glory,  with 20  metropolitan sees, 103 bishops,  and    millions   of believers   in     Syria   and Mesopotamia......The turbulent  thirteenth century,  wracked by invasions  of Latin Crusaders from the West as well as of Mamluk Turks  and Mongols from the East, produced such great leaders as Gregory  Bar  Hebraeus  (1226-1286),  a  Jewish convert   to   Syrian Christianity, a chronicler  and philosopher, and  primate of the East.....The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been turbulent times for the Syrian Orthodox in  the Middle East.....The Syrian church in India numbers 1.8  million and  is divided into two jurisdictions. The smaller  of the  two jurisdictional groups (with    five hundred thousand members and a dozen bishops) decided in the 1970s to revolt against the Indian catholicos and his synod, forming a  wing of  the church    directly administered by the Syrian Patriarch  in Damascus and with its own maphrian see. The  larger   group,  numbering  about   1.3  million  is  an autocephalous church  in India   under Moran Mar Baselius Mar Thoma Mathews  I, Catholicos  of the  East. This group has a flourishing theological seminary and a number of ashrams and monasteries, as well as hospitals, orphanages, schools, and other institutions.  Its members  have established a diocese in North  America with  about  thirty  congregations  and  a bishop residing  in Buffalo,  New York.   The Encyclopedia of Religion, Volume 14 p. 228].

 The  `Seminary  Suit'  was    filed     in  1879  by  Joseph Dionysius against  Mar Thomas Athanasius for recovery of the property over  which he had obtained  possession in lieu of the Quilon  Committee report.  It was  contested  by  Thomas Athanasius who denied the  supremacy of  the Patriarch.  He claimed that  Patriarch could not claim as a matter of right to have any control  over the    Jacobite  Syrian  Church  in Malabar either  in temporal or spiritual matters although as a high   dignitary in the churches in the country where their saviour was  born and crucified the Malabar Syrian Christian community did  venerate the Patriarch. The final judgment in the suit  was given  on 20th July 1889 by the Royal Court of Final Appeal  (Travancore). The decision went   in favour of Joseph Dionysius  who  was  held entitled  to    recover the properties of  Malankara Church as  he  was  the  Malankara Metropolitan  accepted by  the   community.  The  judgment explained the  extent of  the spiritual  supremacy  of the Patriarch over   the  Malankara Church.  It  was  held that Patriarch right consisted in ordaining either directly or by duly authorised delegates metropolitans  from time to time, to manage the spiritual matters of the local church, sending Morone (holy  oil) to  be used in the churches for baptismal and other  purposes and in  general  supervision  over    the spiritual government  of the  Malankara Church.  But he was held to  have no  authority over  temporal matters.  It    was held: "the Patriarch's  supremacy   over the   Church  in Malabar  has   extended only to spiritual   matters. The Patriarch or   his Delegates  when they sojourned in this country,  attended only to spiritual  affairs    of  the Church leaving  the   management of  the temporal affairs to the local Metropolitan and the  trustees. The former never  interfered  with  temporal   affairs; and   where  in  two  or  three instances they  (the   Delegates)  tried to have some control  over,  or interference   with,      the   temporal affairs,  the Metropolitan  and  the community resisted them successfully.

On  a   review  of     the whole  History  and evidence, we  arrive at the  conclusion that the Patriarch of Antioch   has    been   recognized by the   Syrian   Christian  community  all through as  the Ecclesiastical  Head of their   Church   in  alabar; that consecration   by him   or   by his Delegates duly  authorised  in that  behalf  was and has been felt absolutely necessary to  entitle a  man  to  become a Metropolitan of     the  Church  in  this country  in  matters spiritual that  the man  so consecrated  should be  a native Syrian Christian  of Malabar  acceptable to the community:   that the Patriarch's  power in spiritual affairs   of    the  Church  has been supreme:   and that   the     Patriarch  or his  foreign   Delegates  have   had  no interference    with     the    internal administration   of   the temporalities of the Church in Travancore which, in     this        respect   has       been   an independent Church." [Emphasis supplied]

The  concluion  and  finding  of  the  court  that  the Patriarch had  no temporal  and administrative   control over the churches was not accepted either by the Patriarch or the Parishes.  Some of  the  Parishes,  therefore,      denied the authority of  Dionysius which led to filling of suit in 1899 by t  he Metropolitan  against Parishes   which, as  stated, became famous  as 'Arthat Case. The suit was decreed in 1905 and  the   judgement  of  Rajah  (Cochin)  Court  of  Appeal reiterated that   the Patriarch  of Antioch was the spiritual head of Malankara See which included  the church for which suit had been filed and the churches and the properties were bound by  a  trust  in     favour   of  those  who   worship God according to  faith, doctrine,      disciple of  Jacobite Syrian Church in  the communion  of His  Holiness the  Patriarch of Antioch. The  Court held  that the  churches and  properties were,  therefore,   subject  to spiritual,  temporal      and ecclesiastical jurisdiction  of the  Dionysius the Malankara Metropolitan'.

The effect    of the two judgements of the Royal Court of Final Appeal  and  Rajah  of  Cochin  on  one  hand  was  to recognise  Dionysius   as  the     validly  elected  Malankara Metropolitan, which  of course  was in keeping with what the Patriarch  had   decided  when the  meeting  was  held  at Mulunthuruthy and  with this  there was no grievance, and on the other  that Patriarch  had no  temporal power  over  the Church which  was not  acceptable  to  him.  He,  therefore, decided to  come down  to Malabar to influence the course of events   and   get  an assurance  from  different  churches accepting his  superiority  in temporal  matters  as  well. However, in  1905 dispute  started between  two persons one, Abdul Messiah  and other  Abdulla-II over  the right  to  be Patriarch. Both of them  were appointed  by Firman  of the Suitan of  Turkey.But the  one issued  in  fovour  of  Abdul Messiah had been withdrawn.  In 1909 Joseph Dionysius died. In his    place one  M.G. Dionysius  was elected who had got himself ordained  by the  Patriarch Abdulla-II in 1907. When Abdulla-II came to Malabar  with the object of claiming his temporal authority over the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and he  convened a  meeting at  the old Seminary of Kottayam and demanded  acknowledgement of  his temporal authority the majority declined  to do  so. He,  therefore, approached the Parish   Churches   individually  and  succeeded in  getting submission deeds  (Udampadis) from  some including  one Mar Paulose Athanasius.  In token  of it,  he ordained  him as a Metropolitan. This led to dispute between M.G. Dionysius and M.P. Athanasius the one  ordained earlier  at Syria and the other  ordained in  Malabar  over  the   administrative   and temporal control  of the  churches. In 1911 Abdulla-II the Patriarch  ordained   one  Mar  Coorilos  as  the  Malankara Metropolitan so as to make him automatically the ex-officio President of  the  Malankara  Association  and  one  of  the trustees of  the  trust      property.  The two  of  the  other trustees also  acknowledged the new nominee as the Malankara Metropolitan but  Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius did not give up and in   retaliation convened  a  meeting  of  the  Malankara Association which  declared his excommunication invalid and removed from  trusteeship the two trustees who had gone over to the    side of the Patriarch. The Committee further decided to suspend  payment of Ressissa to the Patriarch so long it was not ascertained as  to who was  the  Patriarch,  Abdul Messiah or  Abdulla-II. Abdulla-II  left Malabar  in October 1911 and in 1912 issued a Kalpana branding Abdul Messiah and M.G. Dionysius as "wolves"  from whom the faithful  should entirely keep aloof.

Little did      anyone, then,   visualise that the very next year which  was to  synchronise with visit of Abdul Messiah, yet another Patriarch who had been disentitled by the Sultan of Turkey,  would so  significantly change  the    history  of Malankara Church.  Whether he  was justified  and more than that entitled  to declare  the ex-communication of Dionysius invalid and  whether he  could on  his own  issue a  Kalpana creating a Catholicate of East is now a matter of history as its validity is beyond challenge since both the actions have been upheld  judicially and  have achieved finality in Moran Mar  Basselios  (supra).  Abdul Messiah  issued  a  Kalpana beseeching everyone,  that it was their duty, to respect Mar Gheevarghese, and  love him properly and suitably because he was their head, shepherd and spiritual father. It was stated that who  respects him  (respects us),    he who receives him, receives us.  Those who do not accept his  right words and those who stand against his opinions which are in accordance with the  canon of the Church, defy him and quarrel with him will become  guilty. Keep  aloof from  quarrel and breach of law. Grace  and blessings  from the Lord will come and abide on them who obey.  Another Kalpana was issued bestowing his blessings second  time and  expressing   deep  grief  at   the dissension shown  by Effendi.  It further  said we,  by  the grace of  God, in  response  to  your  request,  ordained  a Maphrian, that is, Catholicos by name; Poulose Basselios and three  new   Metropolitans  the    first     being   Gheevarghese Gregorius,  the  second,  Joachim  Evanios  and the  third, Gheevarghese Philexinos .  We commend  you  into the hands of  Jesus Christ,  our Lord, the Great Shepherd of the flock.    May   He  keep   ou!  We  rest  confident  that   the Catholicos and  Metropolitans - your shepherds - will fulfil all your  wants. The Catholicos, aided by the Metropolitans, will ordain  melpattakkars, in accordance with the Canons of Our  Holy  Fathers  and consecrate  Holy  Morone.  In your Metropolitans  is  vested  the sanction  and  authority  to install a  catholicos, when  a catholicos  dies. No  one can resist you  in exercise of this  right and,  do  all  thngs properly, and  in conformity with Precedents with the advice of the    committee, presided  over by Dionysius, Metropolitan of Malankara. [Emphasis supplied]

The declaration  of Abdul Messiah that ex-communication of Dionysius  was invalid  led to  serious  dispute  between rival groups  claiming their  authority over  the  temporal affairs of  the Church. Two rival groups were formed one led by Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius and the other by Mar Coorilos. Consequently, the  Secretary of State for  India filed  the interpleader  suit   in   1913,  in  the   District  Court  of Trivandrum, impleading both the  sets of rival claimants as defendants and seeking a  declaration from  the court as to which of  the two  rival sets  of trustees  were entitled to draw the  interest on  the amount  standing in the credit of the Malankara  Jacobite Syrian Christian community  in the British treasury.  The suit  was decided  in favour  of M.G. Dionysius. The  decree was  reversed by  a Full Banch of the Travancore High Court in 1923. The judgement was reviewed at the instance  of M.G.  Dionysius and the net result was that M.G.  Dionysius and  his  two co-trustees  became  finally entitled to withdraw the money deoosited in the Court as the lawful trustees of the Church properties.

 On 16th  August 1928  the   Managing  Committee  of the Malankara  Association was authorised   to  draw   up   a constitution of   the Church. There was sharp reaction to it. The delegate  of Patriarch  issued an  order to the Catholic Metropolitan  to  execute  Udampad  within  two days.   When nothing came  out of  it, 18  persons belonging to patriarch group filed  suit against Mar Philexinos. a person who later joined the  Patriarch after 1958 and was largely responsible for the disturbance of peace in 1965. The suit was dismissed in default  and the order remained unchanged as the revision in the High Court  was dismissed  for non-prosecution. The Catholico in  the meantime  went ahead and in a meeting held on 26th   December,  1934  at  Kottayam adopted  the  draft Constitution   unanimously   and   elected   the   Malankara Metropolitan.  The   Constitution  while   recognising  that Malankara Church  was a  division  of  orthodox   church and primacy of Patriarch of Antioch provided that the primacy of the East was in Catholicos. Detailed provisions dealing with powers of Metropolitan, Bishop, Parishes, etc. were made.

Probably as  a counter to 1934 meeting of Catholico the Patriarch group held meeting in August, 1935, elected one M. Paulose Althanasius as Malankara Metropolitan and armed with this they  filed Suit  No.111 of  1139, that  is 10th March, 1938 in the District  Court of    Kottayam claiming  that the Catholico  had  become  heretics  and    separated  from the Orthodox Syrian Church. The  suit was dismissed in January, 1943. In  1946, appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. The defendants again applied for review which was dismissed against which they preferred appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and  in Moran  Mar Basselios  Catholicos & Anr. vs. Most  Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 526 the appeal  was allowed. The judgement of the High Court was set aside  and the  High Court   was directed  to  admit  the review petition  and re-heer  the same. In December 1956 the judges heard  the appeal,  delivered the unanimous judgement allowing the  appeal and  decreeing the  suit.  Against the decree the  Catholico group  preferred an  appeal which was decided in  1959 by  this Court. Some of the Catholicos also filed a   writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution which was  also decided along with  the appeal.  The Court after elaborate  discussion and noticing the earlier course of litigation  held that  the claim  of the other group that the Catholicos had become heretics on aliens or had gone out of the    Church by  establishing a  new church because of the specific acts and conduct was not correct.

 The Constitution framed in 1934 and the Kalpanas issued by Abdul  Messiah were considered by this Court in 1959. The claim of  the Patriarch, that the supremacy of the Patriarch had been  taken away  by  the   mere  adoption of  the   new Constitution was not permitted to be   raised as it was not raised in  the pleadings.  The Court  further did not permit them to raise the  question  about  the  privilege  of  the Patriarch, alone,  to ordain metropolitans and to consecrate Morone. It was also held that Ressissa which was a voluntary and not a compulsory  contribution  made  by  the  parishes collected by  the committee of the Malankara Association and sent to  Patriarch was not forbidden and its non-payment did not amount  to neresy  on the  party of   the Catholicos. The declaration sought  by the Patriarch that they were trustees of the property and the Catholicos were neither trustees nor in possession of the trust property, based on their election at a  meeting held  on August 22, 1935 was not accepted. The Court held  that the  meeting was,  admittedly, held without any notice  to the  members of   the Catholico  party as they were erroneously  regarded as having gone out of the Church. The Court  did not  find any  merit in the Kalpana which was Ex.Z in the suit  commanding   the  faithful  not  to have anything to  do with  the heretics.  The court held that the Catholicos and  their partisans had not become, 'ipso facto' heretics in the eye of the Civil Court or aliens and had not gone out  of the Church. The court held that the election of the plaintiffs was not valid and their suit, in so far as it was in the nature of a suit for ejectment was llable to fail for want  of their title as trustees. The Court further held that since  the interpleader  suit  was  converted  into  a representative suit  on behalf     of Jacobite Syrian Christian population of  Malabar, therefore, the decision in that suit was binding on all members of the Malankara Syrian Christian Community. Thereafter,  it proceeded  to examine as to what were the material issues which were decided in that case and which operated as res   judicata. The four issues which were framed in  that suit  and which were considered by the court for purposes  of deciding  the question on res judicata read as under:

14.  Do all or any of   the following acts of   the  1st defendant (catholico) and his partisans amount  to   open defiance  of the authority of the Patriarch? Are  they against  the tenets of the  Jacobite Syrian  Church  and  do they amount  to heresy   and render them ipso facto heretics and  aliens to  the faith?

 (i)    Claim that the 1st defendant is a Catholicos?

(ii)    Claim that he is the Malankara Metropolitan?

(iii)   Claim that  the 1st  defendant has authority  to consecrate  Morone and the fact that he is so consecrating?

(iv) Collection of Ressissa by the 1st defendant?

15.

(a) Have the 1st defendant and his partisans voluntarily given up their allegiance to and  seceded from the Ancient Jacobite Syrian Church?

(b) Have they established a new Church styled  the Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church?

(c) Have they framed a constitution for the new church conferring authority in the Catholicos to consecrate Morone to ordain the higher orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to issue Staticons allocating Dioceses to the Metropolitans and, to collect Ressissa?

(d) Do these functions   and rights  appertain solely  to the  Patrirch and does the assertion and claim  of the 1st defendant  to exercise these rights  amount to a rejection of the Patriarch?

(e) Have they instituted the Catholicate  for the first  time  in Malankara? Do the  above acts,  if proved, amount to heresy?

16.

 (a) Have the defendants ceased to be members of the Ancient  Jacobite Syrian  Church ?

(b) Have  they forfeited  their right to be trustees  or to hold any other office in the Church ?

(c) Have they forfeited their right to be beneficiaries  in respect of  the trust properties belonging   to  the Malankara Jacobite Syrian community ?

19. 

 (a) Have the plaintiffs and their partisans formed themselves  into a separate Church in   opposition to Mar Geevarghese  Dionvsius and the Malankara   Jacobite  Syrian Church ?

(b)  Have   they separated  themselves from the  main body of the beneficiaries of the trust from 1085 ?

The Court  held that  the same   objection was  raised by the Patriarch in  the suit filed in  paragraphs 19   to 26   and, therefore, the finding recorded  on  the  aforesaid  issues having been  raised and decided in the interpleader suit and having been  decided by the Travancore High Court on review in favour  of M.G.  Dionysius and his co-trustees (Catholico group) it operated as res judicata. It was on this reasoning that the Court held : "that the  contentions put  forward in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the plaint in the present suit on which issues Nos.14, 15,16 and 19 have been raised were directly  and substantially in  issue in the interpleader  suit (O.S.94  of 1088) and  had been  decided by the Travancore High Court  on review in  favour of  Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his two cotrustees (defendants   1    to 3  )  and against defendants    4 to  6 .   In short the  question  whether  Mar Geevarghese Dionysius     and   his    two  co-trustees (defendants 1   to  3 )had become heretics or aliens or had gone out of the Church and, therefore, were not qualified for acting trustees was in issue in the interpleader suit (O.S.No.94 of 1088) and  it was absolutely necessary to decide such issue.  That judgment decided that neither

(a)  the repudiation  of Abdulla II,  nor       

(b)  acceptance of Abdul Messiah who   had   ceased  to   be  a Patriarch, nor 

 (c)  acceptance  of  the  Catholicate with  powers as hereinbefore mentioned, nor  

(d)  the reduction  of  the power of the  Patriarch to  a vanishing point,  'ipso facto' constituted a heresy or amounted  to voluntary separation  by setting  up a new Church and that being the position those contentions cannot be re-agitated  in the present suit".

Thereafter the   Court after  discussing the  matter in great detail held as under :

"The  case   with which the plaintiffs  have come   to court in the   present suit  is that the defendants  had  become heretics or   aliens  or  had  gone  out of the  Church  by establishing a  new  church  because of the specific acts and conduct imputed to the  defendants in the present  suit and  that the  charges founded  on those specific acts and conduct are concluded by the final judgment  (Ex.256) of  the High Court of Travancore in the  interpleader  suit (O.S.No.94 of  1088) which operates as 'res judicata'.  The charge  founded  on the  fact of  non-payment of Ressissa,  if it is not  concluded as constructive 'resjudicata'  by the previous judgment    must, on  merits, and for reasons  already  stated,  be  found against the plaintiff-respondent. We are definitely  of the opinion that the charges now  sought to be relied upon as a fresh  cause of action are not covered by the pleadings or the issues  on which the parties  went to trial, that some of them are  pure after-thoughts and should not now  be permitted  to be  raised and that at   any  rate   most of them could and should   have been put forward in the earlier suit  (O.S. No.94  of 1088)  and that not having been done the same are  barred  by 'resjudicata' or principles analogous thereto. We accordingly hold, in agreement with the    trial court,  that it is no  longer open to the plaintiff-respondent  to re-agitate the question that the defendant-appellant  had 'ipso  facto' become heretic or  alien or had gone out of the church and has in consecuence lost his  status  as  a  member  of  the Church or his office as a trustee." [Emphesis supplied]

The  Court   also  examined  whether  the  election  of   the Catholico group in the meeting held on December 26, 1934 was in accordance with rules or not and it answered the question in  their  favour.  The     Court, therefore,  set  aside     the judgment of  the Kerala High Court  and dismissed  the suit filed by the Patriarch group.

The one good effect of judgment delivered by this Court in 1959 after nearly  50 years of litigation was that good sense appears  to have  dawned on both the groups and on 9th December 1958  Patriarch Yakub-III issued a letter marked as Ex.A-19 one relevant portions of which are extracted below :

"It is  not secret  that the  disputes  and dissensions that  arose in  the Malankara church prevailing for a period of 50 years  have  in several  ways weakened and  deteriorated it. Although right from the beginning  several persons who love the  church and  devout of God desired peace and unity putting an end to the  dissention, they departed in  sorrow without  seeing  the fulfilment of their desire. We also were longing for   peace  in   the  Malankara church and   the unity  of the organs  of the one  body of  the  church.  We   have expressed this  desire of ours very clearly in the apostolic proclamation we issued to you  soon  after our ascension on the Throne.  This desire of ours gained strength  with all vigour   day  by day without in any way slakened  and the  lord God has been pleased to end the  dissention through  us. Glory  be to Him.  To  bring forth peace in  the Malankara church we hereby accept with pleasure Mar Baselious Gheevarghese as  Catholicose.  Therefore we send our hearty greetings intensified by the fervour  of deace in this month of rejoycing. We also beseech,  let the lord shower on you His abundant  blessings. Let  the lord make you  a people  beautified  by virtuous acts   towards  the   right and delight  you with  the comfort and plenteousness  flowing   from  the  care pleased to his Holy will to the envy of others. Let it be with the  grace and mercy of Him,  His  father and His Holy spirit.

Our father   which art  in the heaven etc.  etc.

On  the 9th   December 1958,  

the 2nd   year of our assension as patriarch.

From the Aramana at Holms."

[Emphasis supplied]

The other  letter was issued on 16th December 1958 marked as Ex.A-20 by the Catholico group to the following effect :

"Glory to God united in the Trinity, the self existing, perfect in essence and without beginning or end.

From the meek Baselious  Catholicose named  as Gheevarghese If  seated on the Throne of The East of Apostle St. Thomas.

Seal

Let    divine   grace  and  Apostolic Benediction be always in abundance with all the Melpattakkars (High Priests). Priests, Deacons and all the faithful under our jurisdicition.

We have  always been in grief  on account of the failure of the efforts made by late Mar Gheevarghese Dionisius  and  us to bring forth  peace in our church  and  end quarrels  and discord which were existing in our church for long. We  are now  very much delighted and do glorify  God in  that there is an end to the discord  showing the willingness to unite.

We, for  the sake of peace in the church, are pleased  to accept Moran  Mar Ignatius Yakub III   as patriarch of Antioch  subject  to  the constitution passed by the Malankara Syrian Christian  Association and now in force.

We have  also pleasure to accept the Metropolitans under him (patriarch) in Malankara subject to the provisions of the said constitution.

Let the abundant grace and blessings of God Almighty be with you always.

Let it  be through  the prayers  of St. Mary the mother of God,  Mar homa Sleeba,  the Patron saint of India and all the saints. Amen.

Our father that art in the heavens etc. etc."

After the  exchange of   these letters,  Ex.A-19 and  Ex.A-20 dispute started between the Patriarch and the Catholico over the use  of the word 'Holiness', 'Throne of St. Thomas', and

'Church of  the East'  and 'Catholicos of the East' etc. as the expressions according to the Patriarch could be used by the supreme  head, that is, Patriarch of Antioch and not by Catholico to  which the reply was that this was not new and it was   provided for  in the Constitution of 1934.  It is not necessary to  extract the various points of differnce raised

in the letters issued by the two. In a letter sent in August 1960 marked as Ex.A-26 after reiterating the stand which was taken in earlier letters it concluded with these words :

 "To  conclude,  I wish  to state that the prestige and influence of the throne of Antioch  here depend very largely upon  the wise co-operation of Your Holiness. The Malankara Church with its catholicate and synod of bishops and the  association  has certainly to adhere  to the provisions of the constitution and  has to abide by the Supreme Court decision. But  that does not   mean any  kind  of  disrespect  or hostility towards  Antioch. There  are enough provisions   in  the constitution to keep  our connection  Meeningful  and alive".

The relations  thereafter appear  to have  become cordial so much so that in 1961 Ex.A-30 was written by Petriarch Yakub- III in which it was mentioned,

"I am  placing your  Beatitude's photo properly in  our place  so that all people who are in and out should see itand understand  the intimate unity and real re-conciliation and the essential relationship between the Apostolic Throne  and  our  church  in Malankara ............

we  are eager to see perfect peace  in our church in Malankara.  We hope that all the  disputes will  be over  and  the  church go ahead powerfully  in the path  of light, prosperity and  progress during your Beatitude's old age itself.

Please convey   our  Apostolic Blessings to  all our spiritual children both priests and faithfuls who are under your authority."

But from  letter dated 18th January  1962 sent by Baselius Geevarghese II, Catholicos of the East,  it  appears some local dispute  had surfaced  again.  Allegations were made against one  Mar Philixenos  and the  same person about whom reference  has   been  made  earlier and  who  in  fact   was responsible for  dissension once  again and  it was  stated, they profess  outwardly to  be pro-Antioch,  but really they are anti Patriarchal as well as anti- Catholicate.  Now since at this time I am in my declining age I think it appropriate to invite  your Holiness  be pleased  to visit  us at your earliest convenience  and bless  us by your presence as well as prayers'.  It appears  Mar Baselius Geevarghese died  in January 1964  and the  members of  the Holy  Episcopal Synod installed one  Ougen Mar  Themotheus, Metropolitan  as his successor as  his election  by the  Malankara Association on 17th May  1962 was  approved by the Holy Synod on 21st March 1963. The letter was sent requesting the patriarch Yakub-III for the  installation ceremony.   He did come  in  1964 and installed Mar  Ougen I. Then there  are letters  and  other memoranda   Ex.A-36 and A-37 submitted to the  Catholicos regarding prevailing  discontentment amongst  some sections. The exchange  of these letters and their contents indicate a simmering discontent  which surfaced  in June, 1970 when the Patriarch once  again dug  up the  closed issue of use of expression 'Holiness'  and, 'Throne  of St.  Thomas' by  the Catholico. The  initial anxiety of reconciliation and peace got  set   back   with  vengeance  as  the  Catholico  openly challenged the authority of Patriarch. Events moved swiftly, thereafter, when  the Patriarch ordained Metropolitan who in his turn  ordained Bishops  started interfering resulting in filing of  suits by  Catholico against  Patriarch  ordained Bishop, obtaining  of  injunction  sharply  reacted  by  the Patriarch   by  issuing   show-cause     notice,   starting disciplinary proceedings,  summoning the  Synod at  Damascus and  ex-communicating the  Catholico.  The  breakaway was complete. There was vertical  split. The  two groups  once again were  up in  arms. Two hundred suits were filed. Eight of which  covering entire issues were consolidated and tried together.

This completes the factual narration and the background in which  the suits  out of  which these appeals have arisen came to be filed.  Although both the parties have furnished in great  detail the  events  which  took  place  after the judgment was  delivered in  1959, but it appears unnecessary to mention  each of them, except to observe that a mere look on these dated indicates that initially there was an anxiety for peace and reconciliation by both groups which was shaken by pinpricks  here and there and was finally thrown to winds between 1970-75.  Religious cover  was again  put forward to gain control  over temporal  affairs resulting in setting in motion the  same old  tortuous process of litigation. In the first part  beginning from  December, 1958  a meeting of the Malankara Association  was held in  which  almost  all the Churches participated,  irrespective  of  the  faction.  The meeting was  attended even by the elected priest-trustee and the lay  trustee and  the delegate  of the Patriarch  as  a special  invitee.  In  January,     1959  the  Patriarch  Group submitted a memorandum to the Catholicos seeking among other things reconstitution  of  the  Managing  Committee  of the Malankara Association  which was  considered in a Synod held on 21st February, 1959 and pursuant  to the decision taken therein, dioceses  were re-allotted.  From the    year 1959 to 1964 number  of meetings  were held in which both the groups participated and  attempted to   function as  one unit.     From 1960 to 1962 there are various letters, for instance Exhts. A-28, A-29,  A-30, A-31 and  A-39  which  indicate  cordial relationship between  the Patriarch  and Catholico.  Even in 1964 when  Mar  Ougen  I  was installed  by  the  Malankara Episcopal Synod,  the  Patriarch  himself  presided  in the ceremony.  In  a meeting held in  December,  1965  Malankara Association  elected   five candidates    for  ordination  as Bishops and  elected members to the Managing Committee which included members of the Patriarch group as well. In 1967 the Constitution was amended in consequence of meeting in which both the groups deliberated.

From June   1970 started  the second  part which  was in contrast of  the earlier. In June 1970 the dispute about use of expression  `Holiness' and 'The Throne of St. Thomas' was again questioned  followed by  sending a  delegate  in    1972 which was objected to leading to ordination by the Patriarch of one of the appellants who was impleaded as defendant no.1 in Suit No.4/79. Thereafter as stated there was no end. When the Catholico  succeeded in obtaining injunction from Civil Court in  1973 restraining  the appellant  from interfering, the Patriarch  issued chargesheet in June 1974 which was not only objected  but  asserted  to  be  without  jurisdiction. Various ordinations followed. Each was challenged in courts. And when  on 5th  January 1975 the Catholico in their Synod declared that  Malankara Association  was autocephalous then the Patriarch  in a Synod held at Damascus from 16th to 20th June 1975  decided that the only apostolic see of the Syrian Orthodox Church in the world was the See of Antioch founded by St.   Peter, that  the Malankara Church was an indivisible part  of the Syrian Orthodox  Church  dependent  on the Patriarch in  all spiritual  matters, that acknowledgment of Patriarch's and  position by  those ordained  was essential, and the Catholicos having  repelled against  the  Patriarch stood disqualified  from their ecclesiastical grade and also guilty of violation of fundamental faith. It was followed by letter dated  23rd June 1975 asking the Catholicos if he was willing to  submit to  the decision of the alleged universal Synod. On  21st August 1975 the Patriarch by Kalpana Ex.B-72 excommunicated  Catholicos   and  on   7th  September    1975 installed  at  Damascus  Mar Paulose  Philexinos  (who had earlier been  deposed by  the Malankara Episcopal synod for proved ecclesiastical  indiscipline) as a  Catholicos in the name of Baselius Paulose II.

Out of  these suits  eight covering all the issues were transferred to the High Court. The Single Judge even while accepting the  Constitution as valid held  that it  was not binding on  the Churches  and Parishioners  unless there was express surrender.  The Court  held that they had no concern with  those  Churches  which  continued with  Patriarch  of Antioch. The  learned Single  Judge held  that the Malankara Church was  Episcopal to  a limit  in spiritual affairs.  In matters of  temporalities, the Church was congregational. It was further  held that     the Parish Churches were independent autonomous units  as far as governance and administration of temporalities were  concerned. The  suits were dismissed.  In appeal, the  Bench framed  as many  as 31 questions to cover the wide range of controversy raised before it, reversed the decision of  the learned  Single Judge and decreed the suit, except in  relation to Churches known as 'Simhasna Churches' and   the   Churches established by the Evangelistic Association. Relevant findings on the questions framed by it are extracted below. The  first three questions related to the validity of the Cannon.

They read as under:-

"(1)  Whether  Ext. A90 or Ext.  B161 is the correct version  of  Hudaya Canons accepted by the Malankara Jacobite Syrian  Community as  valid and binding?

(2)  Are the  plaintiffs  barred  by resjudicata from contending  that  the binding version of Hudaya canons is Ext. A90 by reason of the  judgment in XLI T.L.R. 1. order in  the Review Petition and the judgment in 45 T.L.R. 156?

(3) Are  the defendants  barred by  resjudicata from contending that the binding version of Hudaya Canons is not  Ext. B161    by reason  of the decision in the Samudayam suit?"

The answer  given by  it was  that the decision in 41 TLR 1, Exhibit 18  therein, and  (Ext. 3p in the Samudayam suit and Exht. B-161  in these  cases) is  the version  of the Hudaya Canons accepted as binding  on the Malankara Church has not become concluded  and  does  not operate  as  res  judicata between the  parties. The  Bench further held that there was no independent evidence on  the basis   of which it could be held  that  either  of the versions was  binding  on   the Malankara Orthodox  Syrian  Christian  Community  and  since finding in  the previous  litigations were  not res judicata neither version of the Canon was proved to be binding on the community. In  respect of  Question Nos.  4-6, which read as under.

"(4) Whether the Catholicate established under  Ext.  A14  by  Patriarch  Abdul Messiah  with powers  as provided for in Ext. A14 is  valid  and binding  on the  entire  Malankara church?

 (5) Whether  by such  establishment of the Catholicate  the   Patriarch  was deprived of his powers to ordain Metropolitans, consecrate/send morons or to exercise any other spiritual power over  the Malankara  church thereby  reducting  his powers to  a vanishing point?

(6) Whether contentions in points 4 and 5 are  barred by  res judicata   against parties in Patriarch's group  by reason of the  decision of  the Travancore High Court in Interpleader suit (45  TLR 116)  and by  reason of     the decision  of  the Supreme Court  in   Samudayam suit (AIR 1959 SC 31)?

It was held that the Catholicate established under Exht. A14 with powers as provided therein was valid and binding on the Malankara Church,  that by  such establishment Patriarch has not been  deprived of  his powers to ordain Metropolitans or consecrate  Morone  or to exercise  any  other  recognised spiritual power, though the power to ordain Metropolitans is subject to acceptance of the Malankara community represented by the Association and that by  the establishment  of the Catholicate spiritual  power of the Patriarch has not been reduced to a vanishing point, though the Patriarch could not be regarded as having active spiritual supremacy.

The Question  Nos. 7  to 15 related to the Constitution of 1934 and status of Parish Churches. They were answered as follows:-

"(a) 1934 Constitution is valid and binding on the  Malankara Association,  Community, Dioceses  as well  as  parish churches and parishioners.

(b) Parish  churches  are  not  congregational  or independent, but  are constituent units of Malankara  church; they have  fair degree  of  autonomy subject  to the supervisory powers vesting   in the  Managing Committee  of the  Malankara  Association,  Catholicos and the Malankara Metropolitan  as the case may  be. Administration of the day-to-day  affairs of parish churches vests in parish assembly and elected committees of the parishes.

(c) Malankara church is not purely episcopal but has only some episcopal characteristics.

 (d) Malankara Association is a representative body  which has  right to bind the Malankara   church, the community, parishes  and parishioners by its deliberations and actions.

The most  sensitive issue  which has  been subject  of great debate in this Court was posed as Question No.18,

"Has the  Malankara Church become an autocephalous church? and it was answered against the respondent by recording the finding:-

"We, therefore, hold that the Malankara Church is not an autocephalous church but   is a part or division of the world Orthodox Syrian  Church  and set aside the finding of learned single judge that the Catholicos  group  has now  established an  autoceohalous church.  We  hold that  while Patriarch of Antioch is  the head  of  the World Orthodox Syrian  church Catholicos  of the  East who is subject to  the  Constitution  is head of the Malankara Church and  the relationship between  Patriarchate and the Malankara Church is governed by the provisions of the Constitution."

This was the finding recorded in Moran Mar Basselios (supra) as well.  It has  not been challenged,  therefore,  it has become final.

Some of  the  churches  claiming  to  be  socially and culturally different,  for instance, Knanaya Church  or the Kanandra Church  established in  pursuance of  Royal Charter issued   by   the  Queen   or  registered   under   societies Registration Act  or having their own bye-laws claimed to be independent and  autonomous. Their  claim was under Question Nos. 23,  24 and  25 and  the answer  given was that except Simhasana Churches and Evangelistic Association Churches the others were  constituents of Malankara Sabha.  The appellants are the  members of  Patriarch Group.  Separate appeals have been filed  by those churches which claim to be independent. The Catholic  Group is  aggrieved by the decision in respect of  Churches   of  Evangelistic   Association  and  Simhasana Churches.

Factual canvas  having been spread out the stage is now set for   grappling with intricate issues of jurisdiction and law which  have been canvassed neatly, by, both, the learned senior counsel,  Mr. K. Parasaran for the appellant and Mr. F. Nariman  for the  respondents, without  expression of any emotion, admirable understanding and respect for each other, with utmost  congenial coolness and exemplary precision and clarity. To  support their respective claims,  the learned counsel for  both the  parties advanced  extensive arguments covering  wide  range of various  aspects  ranging from maintainability of  the suit  jurisdiction  of  the  civil courts to  entertain religious disputes, misjoinder and non-joinder of the parties, intricate questions of res judicata, religious nature  of the  Trust and  even religious matters, such as whether the  Catholicate of the East is entitled to be addressed  as 'Holiness'  sitting on    the 'Throne  of St. Thomas'.  It  is  proposed  to    deal  with  the preliminary objections both to the   maintainability of  the suit  under Section 9   of   the  Civil  Procedure    Code  and  the  non- maintainability due  to enactment  of the  Places of Worship (Special Provisions)  Act,  1991  as  if  any  of  these  is accepted  then  no   further       controversy   would   arise. Thereafter, what  shall be  examined is whether the claim of the appellant  that they  had ex-communicated the respondent in accordance with Hudaya Canon governing the Church is well founded as  if even  this plea  is accepted,  then no  other issue shall  survive. If  the answer  is in  favour  of  the respondents, then  it shall  have to be decided, how far the dispute between   parties  has    been   settled  by  earlier decisions and what was the scope of Samudayam Suit and the finality arising  out of  it. Ancillary to this would be the question whether  Catholicate of the East was established in Malankara in  the year  1912 and whether it has been validly established, if so, what is its binding effect.

To begin  with the    objection to the maintainability of the suit  under Section   9 of  the Civil Procedure Code was probably not  raised in  1954 and 1959 and if raised was not pressed. But  that by  itself may  not      preclude  defendant- appellant from   raising it, even in this Court as the bar or lack of jurisdiction can be entertained, at any stage, since an order or decree passed without jurisdiction is non est in law. What  then is  the  scope   of  the Section?  Does  it comprehend suits  for declaration  that the  Syrian Churches are episcopal?   Could   the      respondent-plaintiff   claim declaration   that  Malankara Association   had   become autocephalous and  no priest  could refuse  to recognise the authority  of  the  Catholico? Could  the  plaintiff       seek injunction, restra  in the priests or Deacon from performing any other  sacramental services and prohibit the defendants from interfering with of the Malankara Church? How would the bar of   jurisdiction operate  if only part  of  relief  is cognisable? To appreciate these  aspects it is necessary to set out  the Section  itself and  examine its scope and then advert to facts:

"9. Courts to try all civil suits unless  barred.  The  Courts  shall (subject to  the  provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction  to try  all suits of a  civil nature  excepting suits of which their cognizance  is either expressly or impliedly barred.

Explanation I- A  suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding  that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious  rites  or ceremonies.

Explanation   II- For the purposes of this section,  it is immaterial  whether  or  not  any   fees are attached to  the office  referred to in Explanation I or whether or  not such office  is attached to a particular place."

One of the basic principles of law is that every right has a remedy. Ubi  jus ibi remediem is the well known maxim. Every civil suit  is cognisable  unless it is barred, 'there is an inherent right     in every  person to  bring a suit of a civil nature and  unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril,  bring a  suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a  suit, howsoever  frivolous the  claim,  that  the law confers no such right to sue' Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar & Ors., AIR 1974  SC 1126.  The  expansive  nature  of the Section is demonstrated by use of phraseology both positive and negative.  The earlier  part opens  the door  widely and latter debars  entry to    only those  which are   expressly or impliedly barred.  The two  explanations, one  existing from inception and  latter added  in 1976  bring out   clearly the legislative intention  of extending operation of the Section to such religious matters where right to property or office is involved  irrespective of  whether any fee is attached to the office  or not. The language used is simple but explicit and clear.  It is structured on  the basic  principle of  a civilised  jurisprudence   that      absence  of machinery for enforcement of  right renders it nugatory. The heading which is normally key to the Section brings out unequivocally that all civil  suits are cognizable unless barred. What is meant by it  is explained  further by      widening the  ambit of  the Section by  use of the word `shall' and the expression, `all suits of  a civil  nature' unless  `expressly  of impliedly barred'.

Each word   and expression  casts an  obligation on   the court to exercise jurisdiction for enforcement of right. The word `shall'  makes it    mandatory. No  court can  refuse  to entertain a  suit if  it is  of description mentioned in the Section. That is amplified by use of `expression, `all suits of civil  nature'. The word `civil' according to dictionary means, `relating  to the  citizen as  an  individual;  civil rights'. In  Black's Legal  Dictionary it  is defined as, `relating to  provide rights  and remedies  sought by  civil actions as  contrasted with criminal proceedings'. In law it is understood  as an  antonym of  criminal. Historically the two broad  classifications were civil and criminal. Revenue, tax and company etc,  were added  to it later. But they too pertain to  the larger family of  `civil'. There is thus no doubt about  the width  of the word `civil'.  Its width has been stretched further by using the word `nature' along with it. That  is even  those suits  are cognisable which are not only civil  but are  even of civil nature. In Article 133 of the Constitution  an appeal  lies to  this Court against any judgment, decree  or order  in a  `civil  proceeding'.   This expression came        up for construction in S.A.L. Narayan Row & Anr. etc.  etc. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas & Anr. etc. etc. AIR 1965 SC 1818. The Constitution Bench held `a proceedings for relief against      infringement of civil right of a person is a civil proceedings'.  In Arbind     Kumar Singh  v. Nand Kishore Prasad & Anr. AIR 1968 SC 1227 it was held `to extend to all proceedings which   directly  affect civil  rights'.  The dictionary  meaning   of  the  word  `proceedings'  is `the institution of a legal action, `any  step taken in a legal action.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained as, `In a general sense,   the form  and manner of conducting juridical business before a court  or judicial  officer. Regular  and orderly progress  in form  of law,  including  all  possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers  to administrative   proceedings before agencies,  tribunals, bureaus, or the like'. The word `nature' has  been defined as, `the fundamental qualities of a person  or thing;  identity or  essential character; sort; kind; character'.  It is  thus wider  in content.  The word

`civil nature'is wider than the word `civil proceeding'. The Section would,  therefore, be available in every case where the dispute has the characteristic of affecting one's rights which are not only civil but of civil nature.

Are religious  rights, for instance right to worship in a religious  place, entry  in a temple, administration  of religious shrines  for instance a temple, mosque or a church are rights  of civil  nature?  Is  the suit  filed  by the respondent  bad as  the declaration, injunction and prohibition sought  are in  respect of matters which are not civil in  nature? The  answer is given by Explanation I. The Civil Procedure Code was enacted during British period. The legislature enacting  the law  was aware  that there were no ecclesiastical courts either in ancient or Medieval India as in England.  `The term "ecclesiastical law" may be used both in a  general and in a technical sense. In its general sense it means  the law  relating to  any matter  concerning the Church of England administered and enforced in any court; in its technical sense  it  means  the  law  administered  by ecclesiastical courts and persons' [Halsbury's  Laws  of England Vol.  14  para  137].  `The  ecclesiastical  law  of England is  as much the law of the land as any other part of the law' [Halsbury's Laws of England Vol.14 para 139]. There was no such law  in our  country. The ecclesiastical courts are peculiar  to England.  The Parliament  was aware  of it. That is why it added Explanation I to Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. It obviates any ambiguity by making it clear that where even right to an  office is  contested then  it would be a suit of a civil nature even though that right may entirely  depend  on  the  decision  of a question as to religious rites or ceremonies.

Explanation  II  widens  it further to even those offices to which no fees are attached. Therefore, it  was visualised from the inception that a suit in which  the right  to property  or religious office was involved it would be a suit of civil nature. Reason for this is both historical and legal. In England ecclesiastical law was accepted  as a  part of  the common law binding on all. But, `the introduction of English Law into a colony does not carry with it English ecclesiastical law'. (Halsbury Laws of England Vol.  14 para 315). In ancient or medieval India the courts were established by King which heard all disputes. No religious institution  was so  strong and powerful as church in  England.   The  Indian outlook  was always  secular. Therefore,  no parallel can  be drawn between the administration of  the churches   by ecclesiastical courts in England. Religion  in India has always been ritualistic. The Muslim rulers  were by and large tolerant and understanding. They made  India their home. They invaded, ruled and became Indian. But  Britishers made  it a colony. However, that did not  interfere with religion. Disputes pertaining to religious office including performance of rituals were always decided by the courts established by law. As far back as 1885 Justice Mehmood  in Queen Empress vs. Ramzan & Qrs. 1885 (7 ILR) Allahabad p. 461 repelled the argument that the courts were precluded from considering Muslim Ecclesiastical Law and observed at page 468 as under:-

"I am  unable to  accept this view, because, if  it is conceded that the decision of this case depends (as I shall presently endeavour  to  show it does depend)  upon the interpretation of the Muhammadan   Ecclesiastical  Law, it is to  my mind the duty  of this Court, and of all Courts subordinate to it,  to take  judicial notice of such law".

There are  numerous authorities where dispute about entry in the temple,  right to worship, performing  certain  rituals have been  taken cognizance  of and decided by civil courts. In Narasimma  Chariar & Ors. vs. Sri Kristna Tata Chariar 6 Mad. H.C.  Reports 449 it was claimed by the plaintiff that they had the exclusive rights to Adhyapaka  Mirass  of reciting certain  texts or  chants in a temple. In that suit it was held:

 "The claim   is for a specific pecuniary benefit to which plaintiffs declare themselves entitled on condition of reciting certain hymns. There can  exist no doubt that the right  to such benefits is a question which the Courts are bound to entertain, and  cannot cease  to be such a question,  because claimed  on account of some service connected with religion. If, to determine the right to such  pecuniary  benefit, it becomes necessary to  determine incidentally the right to perform certain religious services, we  know of no principle which would  exonerate the Court from considering and deciding the point".

It was approved by the Privy Council in Krishname & Ors. vs. Krishnasamy &  Ors. 1879  ILR 2 Mad. 62 and the  passage extracted above was approved by observing that  it was "perfectly correct". This was a decision when Explanation II was not there. The dispute had two rounds of litigation. In the second round after remand the High Court observed.

"It is  certainly not  the duty of the Civil Court to  pronounce on the truth of religious tenets nor  to regulate religious ceremony;  but,  in protecting persons in the enjoyment  of  a certain  status or property,  it may incidentally  become the duty of the Civil Court  to determine what are the accepted tenets  of the  followers of  a creed and what is the usage they have accepted as established for the regulation of their rights interse."

The Law Commission in its 27th  Report in  Civil Procedure Code,  December 1964  at page 91 while considering the addition of Explanation II to Section 9 observed as under:

"It may      be  added,  that the decision of  the Privy  Council to the effect that a suit for pecuniary benefits is  a civil suit, even if it becomes necessary  to determine  a right to perform religious services,  does not imply that other  suits relating to religious offices cannot be entertained."

In Srinivasalu    Naidu v. Kavalmari Munnuswami Naidu AIR 1967 Madras 451 it was observed,

"The explanation  certainly does not confine the limits of  the nature of suits contemplated by the main section. What  the Explanation states is only that though religious rites and ceremonies may form the basis of a right that is  claimed, such  right  being  a right  to property or  to office, a suit to establish such right would be a  suit of a civil nature.  The Section takes within its broad sweep  all  questions where one person claims any privilege in himself as against others. There is no doubt that such a question  would be one of a civil nature."

On the  plain phraseology  of the  Section, therefore, it is clear that  a suit  filed after coming into  force  of the Constitution for vindication of rights related to worship of status, office or property  is maintainable  in civil court and it would be duty of  the court to decide  even purely religious questions  if they  have a material bearing on the right alleged  in the  plaint regarding worship, status  or office or  property. In Nagar Chandra Chatterjee & Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Mondal &  Ors. AIR 1921 Calcutta 328 it was held:

 "Where  there were  no Ecclesiastical Courts, there was nothing to prevent civil courts from holding that Pujari  has been  removed from  his office on valid grounds."

Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee quoted thus:

 "There is   manifestly nothing wrong in principle that the  holder of a spiritual office should be subject to discipline and should  be liable to deprivation  for what may be called misconduct from  an ecclesiastical point of view  or for  flagrant and continued neglect of duty..... It  is plain  that although  so far as Hindus  are concerned, there is now no State Church and no ecclesiastical court, there is nothing to prevent civil courts from determining questions such as those raised in the present litigation and from holding that the Pujari has been removed from  his office on valid grounds."

In U.W. Baya vs.  U. Zaw  Ta. AIR  1914 Lower Burma 178 (1) where a question arose as to which was the forum where an action for  violation of  religious rights could be brought, it was held,

"there are, therefore, no ecclessiastical authorities  in  Lower Burma. Section 9, Civil P.C. enacts that the courts shall subject to the provisions herein contained, have jurisdiction to  try  all suits of a civil nature  excepting  suits of which the cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.   This is a suit of a civil nature.  It is a claim of certain lands and manuscripts.

The civil  courts, in  our opinion, clearly have jurisdiction to decide the suit and should do so".

 In Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. (1962) 2 SCR 509 this Court observed:

"prima facie suits raising questions of religious rites and ceremonies only are not maintainable in a civil Court, for  they do  not deal with legal rights of  parties.  But  the explanation  to the section accepting the said undoubted position  says that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is  a suit of civil nature notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of  a question as to religious rites or ceremonies.  It implies two  things, namely, 

 (i) a suit for an office is a  suit of a  civil nature;   and

(ii) it does not cease to be one  even if  the said right depends entirely upon a decision  of a question as to the religious rites or ceremonies."

In Ugamsingh  & Mishrimal  vs. Kesrimal & Ors., 1971 (2) SCR 836, it  was held  that right  to worship  is a civil right which can  be subject  matter of  a civil  suit.  The  Court observed :

"It is  clear therefore that a right to worship is a civil right, interference with which raises a dispute of a civil nature."

That the  right to conduct worship is also a civil right has been recognised by the  courts in  T.A. Aiyangar Swamigal & Ors. v.  L.S. Aiyangar  & Ors. 31 Madras Law Journal 758. In Devendra Narain Sarkar & Ors. v. Satya Charan Mukerji & Ors. AIR 1927  Calcutta 783           it was   held that a suit by a person claiming to be entitled to a religious office against an usurper, for  a declaration  of his right to the office is a suit of a civil nature. Similarly in S. Ramnuja Jeer (supra) this Court observed as under:

"From the  aforesaid passage  it is clear that so long as the holder of a purely religious office is under a legal obligation to discharge duties attached to the said office for the non-observance of which he may be visited with  penalties,  a civil court could grant  a declaration as to who would be  or could be the holder of such office."

It was vehemently  urged  that   declaration  of  the character of  a church,  viz., whether it was autocephalous was  solely dependent upon the canonical laws and it necessarily involved an adjudication of what was the applicable canon,  what was  its interpretation and what are the religious  beliefs, practices,  customs and usage in the church which  pertained to  the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the civil courts  could not  embark on such an enquiry. This is   the farthest  or the  highest stand  that could  be taken by the appellant. The answer is twofold, one section 9 of the    Civil Procedure Code and  other Article  25 of the Constitution. The  latter guarntees constitutionally freedom of conscience  and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion  to every  person.  Its  reach  has been explained in  various  decisions.  In  His  Holiness  Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami etc. vs. The State of Tamil  Nadu. AIR  1972 SC  1586 it  was  held  that this Article  guarantees   freedom  to   practice   rituals and ceremonies which  are integral   parts of  a religion  by the followers of a doctrine. In S.P. Mittal vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR  1983 SC  1, it  was held  that  freedom  or  right involving the  conscience  must  naturally  receive a wide interpretation.  The suit filed was thus maintainable. The injunction  and prohibition sought  from  interfering  in administration of Church are certainly matters which pertain to the religious office.  Even the declaration that the Church is  episcopal is  covered in the expansive expression of religion  as explained in Mittal's case (supra). The word 'episcopal, means'  of or  pertaining to  bishops, Having  a govt. vested  in bishop'.  A suit  for declaration of such a right would  be  maintainable  under  section  9.  Not only because it  is claim  to an office but also because there is no other  forum where  such dispute  can be resolved.  If  a dispute arises whether a particular religious shrine has ceased to be so due to its anti-religion activities then the followers of  that religion  or belief and faith cannot be denied the right to approach the court. Explanation I is not restrictive of the right or matters pertaining to religion. It only   removes the doubt to enable the courts to entertain suits where  dispute about religious office is incolved. The right to  religion having become fundamental right, it would include the  right to  seek declaration that the Church was Episcopal. But  the court may refrain from adjudicating upon purely religious  matters as  it may be handicapped to enter into the  hazardous, hemisphere of religion. Maintainability of the   suit  should  not  be confused with exercise of jurisdiction. Nor  is there any merit in the submission that Explanation I  could not  save    suits  where  the  right  to property or to an office was not contested or where the said right depended  on decisions of questions  as to religious faith, belief, doctrine  or  creed.  The  emphasis  on  the expression 'is  contested' used in Explanation  I is not of any consequence.  It widens the ambit of the Explanation and include in  its fold  any right which is contested to be a right of  civil nature  even though such right may depend on decisions of  questions  relating  to  religious  rights  or ceremonies.  But from that  it cannot be inferred that where the right  to office  or property  is not contested it would cease to  be a suit cognisable under Section 9. The argument is not    available on facts but that shall be adverted later. Suffice  it   to  mention  that in Ugamsingh (supra) the plaintiff's claim  was that  they were  entitled to  worship without interference of the idol of Adeshwarji in the temple named after  him at  Paroli according  to tenets observed by the Digambri  Sect of  the Jain   religion. It  was held that from the  pleadings and the controversy between the parties it was   clear that  the issue was not one which was confined merely to  rites and  rituals but  one  which  effected the rights of  worship. If   the Digambaries  have  a  right  to worship at  the temple,  the attempt  of the Swetamberies to put Chakshus  or to place Dhawandand or Kalash in accordance with their things and to claim that the idol is a Swetamberi idol was  to preclude the Digambaeries from exercising their right to  worship at  the temple,  with respect     to which  a civil suit  is maintainable under Section  9 of  the  Civil Procedure Code. The scope  of the Section was thus expanded to include even right to worship.

'Religion is the belief which binds spiritual nature of men to  super-natural being'.  It includes  worship, belief, faith, devotion etc. and extends to rituals. Religious right is the    right of a person believing in a particular faith to practice it,  preach it  and profess  it.  It  is civil  in nature. The  dispute about  the religious  office is a civil dispute as it involves disputes relating to rights which may be religious  in nature  but are civil in consequence. Civil wrong is  explained by  Salmond as  a private  wrong. He has extracted Blackstone  who has  described private  wrongs as, 'infringement or  privation of the private  or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries'.  Any infringement with a right as a member of any religious order is violative  of civil wrong. This is the letter and spirit of Explanation  I to  Section 9.  In American  Jurisprudence volume 66, paragraph 45, the law is explained thus.

"The (the) civil courts have steadily asserted their want of jurisdiction to hear and determine any controversy relating thereto. On teh other hand, the civil courts have without hesitation exercised heir jurisdiction to protect the temporalities of such bodies, for whenever rights of property are invaded, the law must interpose equally in those instances where the dispute is as to church property and in those where it is not".

In Long vs. Bishop of  Capetown, 1863  (1) Moore PCC NS 411, where the Bishop held an ecclesiastical court for proceeding against  the appellant who  was authorised to perform ecclesiastical duties  in a  Parish was held as  coram non judice as  he had  no authority to hold  an  ecclesiastical court. The  court held that where no Church was established by law  it was   in the same situation as any religious body, therefore, if  any tribunal  was constituted by such body which was  not court then its decision would be binding only if it  was exercised  within the  scope of the authority.  In Dame  Henriette Brown vs.  Les  Cure   Et Marguilliers  De L'Oeuvre Et  Fabrique De  Notre Dame De Motreal, 1874-75 (6) PC 157,     the Privy  Council while  following the decision in Long (supra)  held that  where a Church was merely a private and  voluntary religious society resting only upon  a consensual basis courts of justice were still bound when due complaint was  made that a member of the society was injured in any manner of a mixed spiritual and temporal character to inquire into the laws and rules of the tribunal or authority which inflicted the alleged injury and ascertain whether the act complained of was  law and discipline of the Church and whether the sentence  was  justifiably  pronounced  by  a competent authority.  The decision  in Long (supra) has been followed in this country in Anadrav Bhikaji Phadke & Ors. v. Shankar Daji Charya &  Ors. ILR  7 Bombay 323 where certain persons brought  a suit  that their  right of worship in the sanctuary for a temple was being infringed, it was held that the right  of exclusive worship of  an idol  at  particular place set up by a caste was civil right.

The law  being such  it may  be seen  whether the  suit filed by the respondent is covered within the forecorners of Section 9.  Whether the relief sought by the respondent was regarding the  status or  office  of  the  Metropolitan?  In Original Suit  No.4 of    1979  it  is  claimed  that  various persons said  to be  ordained as metropolitans have no right to act    as such and priest  ordained in  turn by them would equally have  no right to act as  such,  all these  being usurpers.  Further   the  office   of  metropolitan  in   the Malankara Church  has, with  it, attached  legal obligations for the  non-performance of which sanctions or penalties are provided is clear both from the canonical law as well as the Constitution. Apart  from this    four suits, namely, Original Suit Nos.2/79, 5/79, 6/79 and 8/79 concern themselves solely with  the  interference    in  the  administration  of  Church properties being  scheduled specifically  in the  respective plaints. Similarly  the claim founded on allegations against wrong persons  exercising the  functions by  those who  have been wrongly designated as metropolitans and are interfering with the right to worship in Churches appears to be squarely covered in  Section 9.   The prayers in Original Suit No.4/79 were 'A'  to 'H'.  Even if  the prayer  'A'  which  seeks  a declaration that  Malankara Church is episcopal in character ignored the suit for reliefs 'E','F', 'G' and 'H' which read as under  cannot be held to be touching only religious rites and therefore, are not cognisable by Civil Court:

E. To declare  that  any  Priest who refuses to recognize the authority of the  Catholicos and Malankara   Metropolitan,   the 2nd plaintiff and  other Metropolitans under him is not entitled to minister in  any of  the churches or its institutions in Malankara.

 

F. To  prohibit defendants  1 to  3 by   an  order  or  permanent  injunction from ordaining Priests  or  deacons or performing any other sacraments, services etc.  for the  Malankara church or its institutions.

 

 G. To prohibit  defendants   4 onwards from performing any religious services a sacraments whatsoever in or about any of the  church of Malankara and for the  Malankara church or its constituent churches or institutions.

 

H. To prohibit the defendants from interfering in any manner with the administration of the Malankara church."

The  appellant   placed  reliance  on  various  averments  in different  I.As, written arguments  and affidavits  to demonstrate that  the nature of relief sought was beyond the pale of  Section 9.  In fact  this dispute was not seriously raised before  the courts  below. The  dispute is  going  on since long  and this  is as  stated the  third round in this Court. But  it appears   that in   earlier litigations  in the Royal Court  of Final  Appeal and  the Supreme Court no such objection was  taken that the suit was not maintainable. The submission that the locus  standi  of  the  respondent was suspect as  they having been ex-communicated by the Synod of the orthodox church with Patriarch as its head, did not have any substance  as in Sardar Syendna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State  of Bombay  (1962) Supp.  2 SCR 496 a Constitution Bench of  this Court  held that the exercise of the power of ex-communication by  the religious  head on religious ground form part  of the  management of  its affairs  in matters of religion and  since Articles  25 and  26 of the Constitution protect not  merely religious, doctrine and beliefs but also acts done  in pursuance of religion and themselves carrying the  rituals  and  observations,  ceremonies  and  right  of worship which  are integral part of religion it is difficult to agree  that there  was no  forum for   vindication of such right.

Even the  argument that the declaration that the Church was autocephalous  or Episcopal is cognisable only in  the ecclesiastical jurisdiction  and the  civil courts could not embark on such an  enquiry  does  not  appear  to  be   well founded. A  civil court   may be precluded from deciding what rites are  necessary  to  impart  religious  character.  For instance, whether  kaivapu, that  is placing  of the hand by the spiritual  head for ordination is necessary or Morone, that is,  oil of  see must  be there may be a matter for the Synod. But who has  a right to perform it or whether it has been performed as provided in the religious book and whether a  Church  has  become autocephalous  due  to  adoption  of Constitution by a Synod  are matters  which can  surely and certainly be  decided by  the courts.  The learned  counsel submitted that   question whether  the Malankara Church was governed  in its  administration  by  the  Constitution  of Malankara Church  with reference  to the Constitution passed in M.D. Seminary meeting in 1934, which dealt with religious and ecclesiastical  aspects of     the  Church,  could  not  be adjudicated upon  by the  civil courts. According to learned counsel the  Constitution expressly  adopted  the  Catholico version of the canon  and  made  provisions  in  regard  to ordination of  priecs, bishops, Catholicos andthe discipline to which  they were  subjected, these  were mere  matters of religious rites and ceremonies and involved an adjudiction of the question of religious faith, creed and doctrine which would be  wholly outside  the scope of the civil courts. The learned counsel submitted that  the single  most  important question on  which the fate of these appeals and suits would turn was  as to  which was  the correct version of the canon applicable to Malankara Church  and this was a matter which entirely depended  on questions relating to  the  religious faith, doctrine    and belief. It was also emphasised that the various decisions given by this Court, namely, Sardar Syedna Tahar Saifuddin  Saheb vs. The State of Bombay, 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 496;  Uqamsingh & Mishramal vs. Kesrimal & Qrs., 1971(2) SCR 836; Thiruvenkata Ramanuja       Pedda Jiyyangarlu  Valu vs. Prathivathi Bhayankaram Venkatacharlu & Ors. AIR 1947 PC 53; M. Appadorai  Ayyangar &  Ors. vs.  P.B. Annanqarachariar  & Ors. AIR  1939 Mad.  102; Kattalai Michael Pillai & Ors. vs. J.M. Barthe  & Ors., AIR 1917 Mad. 431; E.C. Kent vs. E.E.L. Kent. AIR  1926 Madras 59 and Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. vs. Sri   Ranga Ramanuja          Jeer & Anr., 1962 (2) SCR 509 would indicate that  Explanation 1  to Section  9 saved only those suits where  the right   to property or  to  an   office   was contested. But  where no  contest was  raised the suit would not be covered within  the  forecorners  of  the  Section. Reference was  made to paragraphs 301 to 304, 313 to 315, 318, 321,  332 to 339, 343 to 346, 352, 354, and 356 of Vol. 14 of Halsbury's Laws of England and it was urged that these paragraphs would  show that  the position  of the  crown  in England in  respect of    Church was  entirely different.   The learned counsel submitted that  passages  which  have  been relied to  deal with  the Anglican Church relate to colonies where the  supremacy of the Crown in ecclesiastical affairs still exists. He urged that those passages have no relevance to a  sovereign secular   country  like India. The learned counsel pointed out that  the decisions in Long (supra) and Dame (supra) arose in different colonies which accepted the supremacy of  the Crown in ecclesiastical matters and apart from  the  regular  hierarchical  set  up  in  the  Anglican Churches or  the Churches  in the  colonies the civil courts also exercised   jurisdiction. These  decisions arising from jurisdictions where  Church was part of the State could not apply in a country like India where religious neutrality was mandated by the secular constitution. In the end the learned counsel promitted  that the  judiciary should keep its hands off in respect of such religious matters.

The submissions  do not  appear to  stand the  test  in light of  what has been stated earlier. The relevant passage from Halsbury's Laws of England have already been extracted to demonstrate  that the  ecclesiastical law of England does not apply  to colonies.   There is  no statute  framed  even during British  regime which  had adopted  the statutory  or common law  to the Churches in India. The mere fact that the Churches in England are governed by ecclesiastical law could by no  stretch of  imagination furnish  foundation  for  the submission that the Churches in India would also be governed by ecclesiastical  law.  The jurisdiction of  courts depends either on  statute or  on common  law. The  jurisdiction  is always local  and in  absence of any statutory provision the cognizance of  such dispute  has to  be taken  either  by  a hierarchy  of     ecclesiastical     courts   established  in   the country where  the religious institutions are situated or by a statutory  law framed by the Parliament. Admittedly no law in respect of Christain Churches has been framed, therefore, there is  no statutory  law. Consequently  any  dispute  in respect of religious office in respect of Christians is also cognisable by  the civil  court.  The  submission  that  the Christians stand on a  different footing  than    Hindus and Budhists, need not be discussed or elaborated. Suffice it to say that  religion of  Christians, Hindus,  Muslims,  Sikhs, Budhs, Jains  or Parsee may be different but  they are all citizens of  one country  which provides  one and  only one forum that  is the  civil court  for adjudication of their rights, civil or of civil nature.

In reading Section 9  widely and construing it expansively the jurisdiction  to entertain a suit for declaration  whether the Church was episcopal  or congregational and whether the appellants could  have been ordained by the Patriarch  when  it  was  contrary  to the earlier decision given by this Court that the ordination was required to  be approved  by Synod,  the court  is not being asked to  adjudicate on faith but  whether the exercise of right in  respect of  faith was valid. The  Grace no  doubt comes from  Patriarch and  on that  there is  no dispute but whether the  Grace came  in accordance with the Canon or the Constitution is certainly a  matter which would fall within Section 9  C.P.C. Status  and office  are no doubt different but what  was challenged  is not  the  status  or  faith  in Patriarch but  the exercise of right by Patriarch  which interfered with the Office of Cathelico held validly. Apart from it, as stated earlier, after coming into force of the Constitution Article 25 guarantees a fundamental right to every citizen of his conscience, faith and belief, irrespective of cast, creed and sex, the infringement of which is enforceable in a court of law and such court can be none else except the civil courts. It would be travesty of justice to  say that the fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution is incapable of  enforcement as  there  is no court which  can take cognisance of it. There is yet another aspect of the matters that Section 9 debars only those suits which are  expressly or impliedly barred. No such statutory bar could  be pointed out. Therefore, the objection that the suit under  Section 9  C.P.C. was not maintainable cannot be accepted.

The other     objection to the maintainability of the suit was based on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 (`Act'  for short).  This Act  was enacted  to prohibit conversion of  any place  of worship  and to provide for the maintenance of  its religious character as it existed on the 15th day of August, 1947 and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section    2(c) defines  `worship'  to mean `a temple, mosque, gurudwara, church, monastery or any other place  of public    religious worship  of any  religious denomination  or  any  section   thereof,  by  whatever   name called'. Section 3 bars any person from converting any place of worship  or any  religious denomination  into a  place of worship of a different  section of the same  religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof.  Section  4  declares that the  religious character of  a place  of worship  existing on 15th day of August, 1947 shall continue to be same as it existed on that date. Therefore,  it was  urged that  the suit having been filed for declaration that the Syrian  Churches   were apostolic  and   autocephalous,  it  amounted  to  seeking  a declaration as   to religious  character    of  the  places  of worship and  consequently it was barred and the court cannot assume jurisdiction  to grant  such declaration. The learned counsel urged  that each Parish Church is a place of worship within the  meaning of    Section 2(c)  of  the  Act  and   the religious  denomination  is  the  Jacobite  Syrian  Orthodox Church in  Malabar. According  to learned counsel, it having been held  in  successive  decisions  that  there  were two sections  of  the  said religious  denomination,  one,  the Patriarch Group and the  other, Catholicos  and  these two denominations existed on 15th day of August, 1947, factually and legally,  the  suit filed by the respondents  for  a declaration that the Jacobite Church was autocephalous was not maintainable  and liable  to be dismissed on this ground alone.   The learned  counsel submitted that the Parish Churches believed  in uniterrupted  apostolic succession  of St. Peter through the Patriarch and that the spiritual grace emanates  through such Patriarchs and, therefore, the declaration  sought  by the respondents  could  result  in destroying the basic character of the religious denomination.  It  is  not  necessary  to  deal with these submissions at length as  sub-section (3) of Section 4 is a complete answer to it. It reads as under:-

"Nothing contained  in sub-section  (1)  and  sub-section (2)  shall apply to,-

 

(a) any  place of  worship referred to in the said sub-sections which is an ancient and historical monument or an archeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archeological  Sites  and Remains Act, 1958 (24  of 1958)  or any other law for the time being in force;

 

(b) any  suit, appeal  or other proceeding, with respect to  any matter referred to in  sub-section  (2),   finally decided, settled or disposed of  by  a court, tribunal or  other authority before the commencement of this Act;

 

(c) any  dispute with  regard to any such matter  settled by the parties amongst themselves before such commencement;

 

(d) any  conversion of  any  such place effected before such commencement by acquiescence;

 

(e) any  conversion of  any such place effected before such commencement which is not  liable to be challenged  in any court, tribunal or other authority being barred by limitation under any law  for the time being in force".

The Syrain jacobite Church is an ancient and historical monument which was established sometime in 51-52 century A.D. The respondents did not seek a declaration for conversion of the church or place of worship. The matter of the religious denomination was settled as far back as 1876 in the Mulunthuruthy Synod. Even the declaration sought that the Church is autocephalous is founded on the Kalpana issued in 1912 and the Constitution framed in 1934. No declaration is sought  for change  of the  place as it existed in 1947. Further, whether  the declaration  sought for can be granted or  not  is  a  different  matter  than claiming that the declaration if  granted would result in converting the place of worship  or the  religious denomination.  This objection, too, therefore, is not available on facts of this case.

Reverting to  merits the principal issue that calls for adjudication  is  about   the  scope  of excommunication  in ecclesiastical matters and the extent to which the Court can examine it and lastly whether the  ex-communication of the Catholico  by  the Synod held  at Damascus under the Presidentship of  the Patriarch   of Antioch was valid either canonically or conventionally? The principal defence in the suit from  which these appeals have  arisen, was  that  the Catholico-plaintiffs were  ex-communicated,  therefore, the suits were liable to be dismissed. Two questions arise, one, the  jurisdiction of the civil court  to examine ex-communication and  second, whether  the ex-communication was in accordance  with law. Taking up the first question as to whether the  civil courts  are competent  to decide  on  the validity  of  the  ex-communication,  the  answer,  in this connection, has been given  while deciding the objection of maintainability of  the suit  under Section  9 CPC.  Yet  it would not be inappropriate to mention how far the protection of  a  civil  court  extends  regarding the ecclesiastical matters. The  law has  been explained in paragraphs 315, 332 and 337 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 14. A church is formed by  the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual  basis -  their rights apart from statutes will be protected  by the  courts and  their discipline  enforced exactly as  in the  case of  any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised.  Therefore, all  religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of  the protection  of their rights and the sanction given to  their  respective  organisations.  It  is further settled that discipline of a church cannot affect any person except by  express sanction  of the  civil power  or by the voluntary submission  ofthe  particular  person.  But  for purposes of  enforcing discipline  within a church religious body may  constitute a  tribunal to  determine whether its rules have  been violated  by any  other members  or not and what will be the consequence of that violation. In such case the tribunals  so constituted  are not in any sense courts, they derive  no authority from the statutes and they have no power  of   their  own to enforce their sentence.  Their decisions are  given effect  to by the courts as decision of the arbitrators whose jurisdiction rests entirely on the agreement of the parties. Consequently if any member of such body has  been injured  as to  his rights  in any  matter of mixed spiritual and temporal  character the  courts of   law will, on due complaint being made, inquire into the laws and rules of  the tribunal or authority which has inflicted the injury and  will ascertain  whether any sentence pronounced was regularly  pronounced by  competent authority,  and will give such redress as justice demands. See Long (supra), Dame (supra) and Anadrav (supra).  In  Hasanali & Ors. vs. Mansoorali &  Ors., AIR  (35) 1948 PC 66, it was held that a court of  law cannot recognise a purported ex-communication as valid  if principles of substantial justice have not been complied with.

Ex-communication in  religious order  and that tco of a spiritual head entails serious consequences both religious and  civil.'Ex-communication'  is  defined  in Black's Law Dictionary as  'a sentence  of censure    pronounced by one of the  spiritual courts  for offences falling under the ecclesiastical cognizance.  It is described as two-fold:

 (1) The  lesser  excommunication,  which  is  an  ecclesiastical censure, excluding  the party  from the   sacraments;

(2) the greater,  which    excludes  him  from  the  company  of all Christians. Formerly,  too, an    excommunicated man was under various civil  disabilities. He could not serve upon juries, or be  a witness  in any  court; neither  could he  bring an action to recover lands or money due to him.

These penalties were abolished in England  by St.  53    Geo.  III,  c.  127. Excommunication is  still a  censure under  Canon  Law".  In Faiths of  the World by James Gardner, it is discussed under 'Anathema'  and  'Censure'.  The Anathema  was usually administered to offenders. 'It    is well known that a solemn Curse or  anathema "with bell, book, and candle" against all heretics, is annually pronounced by the pope at Rome, and by other ecclesiastics  in other places  on  the Thursday  of Passion week, the day before Good Friday, the anniversary of the   Saviour's crucifixion".   The  substance of the "Anathema"is in these words:

"Excommunicated and  accursed may they be, and  given body and soul to the devil.  Cursed be they in cities,  in towns,  in  fields, in  ways, in  paths,  in  houses, out of houses, and  all other Places,  standing,  lying,  or rising,  walking running,  waking, sleeping, eating, drinking, and whatsoever things  they do besides.  We separate them  from the  threshold,  and from all prayers of the church."

'Censures  (Ecclesiastical)"   is 'the various  punishments inflicted by the Christian church upon delinquent members of  her  communion, in  virtue of that authority  which has been committed to  her by  Christ, the  great King and Head of the church'.

One of  the effects  of such  action is that the person concerned is  deprived of  the risnt  of worship.  Under our Constitution it   is a fundamental right. Any intemenace with it or  its deprivation       can be challenged in a court of law. Even in England  the  Courts  extend protection  regarding ecclesiastical matters if they affect the right as is clear from paragraph 337 of  Halsbury's Laws of England,  Fourth Edition, Volume 14.

In the  light of the law thus stated it may be examined if the  ex-communication of  Catholico by  the Patriarch was valid as  if  the  power  of  ex-communication was validly exercised then the suit filed by them was not maintainable. The specific case in this regard of the appellants was that, 'canonically' and,  'traditionally' the Patriarch of Antioch is the    supreme head  of the  Holy Universal Syrian Orthodox Church and  the Catholicos,  is subordinate to the Patriarch of  Antioch'.  Therefore,  the Catholico was validly  ex-communicated in  accordance with  the canon filed as Ex. 18, which is the foundation of the power and jurisdiction of the Patriarch. How far  is correct?  In  Moran  Mar  Basselios (supra) it  was held  that the  Catholicos had not committed any act of heresy. Could they be held to have committed act of heresy  when, then  used the  world 'Holiness' and on the 'Throne of  St. Thomas'. From the New Testament - The Gospel according to  St. Mathew. Chapter 19  it appears  there was throne for each apostle:-

"Then answered Peter and said unto him, Behold, we have foresaken  all, and followed thee; what  shall  we  have therefore?"

"And Jesus  said unto them, verily I say  unto  you,  That  ye  which have followed me,  in the  regeneration when the son  of,  man shall sit  in the throne of his glory,  ye also shall sit upon twelve  thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel".

St. Thomas  was, 'one  of the  original   apostles  of  Jesus Christ' [Religions of India by Dr. Karan Singh, P. 15]. In a book written  by E.M.  Philip, one  of the authors on Syrian Church, the  effect of the judgment by Royal Court of Appeal is  described thus,  'of  course.  the majority  judgment prevailed and Mar Dionysius was established on the throne of St. Thomas'.  The expression 'Melapattakaran of the throne in Malayalam' has been used  by Royal  Court of  Cochin in its judgment thus,

"He  upheld    the   contention   of  Mar Thomas Athanasius, and found that the Syrian Church was  independent  of the Patriarch  of Antioch.  Of course, the majority judgment prevailed,  and Mar  Dionysius  V.  was established  on the throne  of St.Thomas".

In Exht.  A-4 (Notice  for M.D. Seminary Meeting  of  1934) issued to  Vicars, Priests,  Kykars and Parishioners, it was mentioned:-

In the letter dated  8th June, 1959, Ex. A-24, the Catholic in his reply to the Patriarch wrote as under:-

"3. His Holiness: The propriety of using the title 'His  Holiness' along with my  name is questioned.  Now I must  bring to your  notice  that fact that customarily the  same  ephithets have  been   attached  to  the  Patriarch  and  the  Catholicos  in our church as evinced by our Holy writs  and other books.  For example,  in the diptych (first  intercession of the Church, during the Holy Qurbana, the people are asked to pray for our Patriarchs Aboon Mar Ignatius and Aboon Mar Baselios. The very same titles are here seen applied to the Patriarch and the Catholicos, alike, the later himself being called a Patriarch. The  inference is that the titles proper to the Patriarch of Antioch are proper also to be Catholicos of the  East.  We also see that such epithets as Moran, Aboon,  etc.  are applied to both the prelates  in common. Further  this title  has been in use here for long time.

4. The  Throne of  St. Thomas: Your Holiness  says 'It  is  never heard that St.  Thomas established a throne of the Catholicos  or the  Mapriano, either in India or  in my  other place'.  I must, without presumption,  ask your Holiness, whether for that matter,  any apostle  has established a  throne anywhere. Is it not that such honours have been connected, with them in latter times.  There is also no  special thronal ascension for any dignitary of our  church  except the installation ceremony(......) done  at the time of the consecration of Bishops and other prelates and  at their acceptance  by their respective  dioceses. Besides,  we see that this   term 'throne' is added to the Patriarchs, Metropolitans  and Bishops alike in the Hudaya Canon and other books (Canon Chap. VII, Section  I)  and the ceremony of enthronment is done over for Bishops.

Your Holiness  knows that  the very eminent Syrian Historical  writer Gregories  Bar Heoraous regards St.Thomas, the apostle, as the first bishop  of the  East.  Let me also bring to your notice that the Malankara Church Historian, E.M.  Philip who had been  a staunch partisan of the Patriarch, refers to the throne of St. Thomas, in his history of the Malankara Syrian Church (2nd Edition page 253).  That  being the case, can we say that St.  Thomas, one among  the twelve eminent apostles, had no throne at all.

Your Holiness  says 'Also  we could not find such a throne in the document given  by Abdul Messiah II'. I am indeed happy that your  Holiness respects and  depends upon the  Kalpana given by  Abdul Messiah II.  But it must caution your Holiness  that the  Kalpana you refer to may be the  General Kalpana that  he issued  just before  he left  Malankara  (1913).  The earlier Kalpana issued by him  from Niranam Church on the day he installed  Mar Ivanios of Murimattom as Catholicos, had to be necessarily referred to.  To make things  clear, I shall quote  a sentence  from  it.  "According  as  you requested we have consecrated our spiritual and  beloved  Ivanious as Mapriano under  the name Baselios of the East, on  the throne  of the  Diocese of St. Thomas  in India and other  places".  (1912). This is very definite and no one could say that a throne like this was a now find or one found without the knowledge of the throne of Antioch".

This letter  explained the  justification  for use of the expression, 'Throne  of St. Thomas' and 'Holiness'. Whatever may be its religious  significance but in view of what has been stated above coupled  with the conduct of the Patrirch in not only  condoning and accepting its use but even presiding in the installation  ceremony, it is difficult to treat it as an act of heresy deserving ex-communication.

Apart from  it, the four charges levied in  the show- cause notice were as under:-

(i) That  the Catholicos  claimed to be seated  on  the  Throne  of  St. Thomas.

(ii) That  he declared that he was equal in  status to the Patriarch which was uncanonical as he was a subordinate.

(iii)  That he did not accept the Patriarch delegate in  India (sent in 1972) and resorted by all means "to send him off".

(iv) That at the time of ordination of three Metropolitans in 1966 by  the Catholicos, the Catholicos did not take an oath of subordination to the Patriarch.

None of them individually or collectively could attract the punishment of  excommunication even if found to be true. The nature and  the power  to be  exercised for  excommunication have been  indicated earlier. They are not lightly exercised as they  deprive a  person of  his right of worship. The accusation that  the Catholico was  subordinate to Patriarch was not an accurate description. The Patriarch of Antioch was and is undoubtedly the highest ecclesiastical functionary. But the second highest dignitary was and is the Catholicate of   the East. The concept of subordinate amongst such spiritual heads is out of place. They function in their own sphere  according to  religious canon. When Patriarch of Antioch was established in  Synod of Nicea the Catholico of the East  was established  at Tigris. The two authorities in the hierarchy  existed from 4th century. Therefore, the creation of Catholico in 1912  in  Malankara  conferring jurisdiction  over  India, Ceylon  and Burma was  neither against scriptures  nor against faith. The exercise of power by the Catholico in pursuance of such creation and under the Constitution which  was framed in 1934 could not entail ex-communication. The  action of  Patriarch in ex-communicating the Catholico deprived him of the religious right guaranteed to him under the Constitution, therefore,  it had to be in accordance with law. Even  the meeting summoned at Damascus being in  violation of the Constitution of 1934 was invalid. Therefore, the ex-communication of  Catholicos was not in accordance with law.

Was the  ex-communication canonical? If the religion is a bond  uniting man to God then canon is a rule or decree, a body of principles and standards the practice and observance of which identifies the man with the religion. 'The identity of the religious community described as  church consist in the identity  of its  doctrine, creeds, formularies, rituals etc.' [Hidayatullah,  J. in Ninal Daniel v. Most Rev. Ubanon Marthoma, Metropolitan of Mar Thoma  Church,  and others, Civil Appeal no.947 of 1964 decided on 7th January, 1965]. Canon is explained in Black's Law Dictionary as under:

"A law,  rule or  ordinance in general, and of the church in particular. An ecclesiastical law or statute.  A rule of  doctrine or discipline. A  criterion or  standard of judgment.   A body of principles, standards, rules, or norms."

Canon means both a norm and attribute of the scripture. The  erm  'canon law'  is explained in The Encyclopedia  of Religion Vol. 3 as under:

"The term    canon is based on the Greek word Kanon. Originally signifying a straight rod or bar, especially  one used to keep something  else straight, canon came to mean something that  is fixed,  a rule  or norm. The term has several applications in church usage: the canon  of scripture, or that fixed list of books that are determined to belong to sacred scripture; the canon  of the Mass, the fixed portion of the eucharistic prayer;   the  process of declaring a deceased person to be among the fixed list of saints in heaven, or canonization. From  the third  century,  directives for  church living  and norms for church  structures and procedures have been issued as canons.

Canon law  refers to  the law internal to the church.  In the early centuries of  Christianity, canon  was used for internal church norms, to distinguish them from the imperial nomos (leges in Latin) or laws. Church norms have also been known as sacred  or divine, to distinguish them from civil or human laws. At times  they are referred to as the  "sacred canons" or the "canonical order". The term ecclesiastical law refers to the civil law adopted in various nations to regulate church affairs. The term canon law is used in the Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox communions.

Canon law is drawn from sources in scripture, custom, and various decisions of church bodies and individual  church authorities. Over the centuries  these have been gathered in a variety of  collections that serve as the law books for various churches".

Canons are  thus the principal scriptural bases for the religious practices  observed in a Church.  Syrian Orthodox Church is  very old.  But its  canon appears to have come in existence sometime  in 13th Century collected and written by Bar Hebrew  who was  the Catholico  of Tigris. In the appeal arising out of interpleader. suit this Court after examining the evidence in detail particularly of C. Philip, P.W.5, who was the Professor of  the Sriram College, Calcutta and was examined, as  expert on canon law  held that  there was  no authorised edition  of these  canons even  though one of the resolutions at the Mulunthuruthy Synod ran thus :

"It will  be very  good if  a book containing the  Canons  and  procedure necessary for the firmness  in  the Orthodox faith is printed in Syriac or Malayalam as per orders (of  the Holy father) and a copy with his seal given to each church and decided that future conduct  shall not be except  in accordance with that."

The absence  of any  canon in  such an  old Church  existing since 51-52  Century A.D. with such extensive and widespread following not  only in this country  but even others is  a tribute to the honest, firm and sincere belief in the Syrian Church. Even  without any written Code or rule their never was any controversy over faith, practice,  belief, rituals etc.  But what is surprising is that till the advent of late 19th  and the beginning of 20th Century there was  no authentic publication of it. Consequently when the battle in courts of law started between the two groups there appeared two divergent versions differing on vital aspects. To add to this the courts have not been consistent in accepting one or the other  version.  More so  because of  the accusation of interpolation and tampering.  Even though the first occasion to examine the canons arose in the appellate judgment of the Royal Court,  the  scope was limited as to whether the Patriarch alone  had the  power to  consecrate  Morone. The authority to  ex-communicate etc. in which the interpolation is alleged  was never  examined.  The  decision,  therefore, cannot be taken to be as putting its seal of approval on the authority of  the canon   produced on  behalf of Patriarch of Antioch.  And when the power  and  jurisdiction  to   ex-communicate in accordance with canon law was raised in the interpleader suit (Vattipanam suit) both the sides came with different versions,  the one filed by Catholico was accepted by the   trial court whereas the High Court found the version placed by  the Patriarch  as authentic. Both the  judgments abound in   thorough  and  careful  analysis  of  difficult subject. The  discussion is  extensive and  learned. But all this labour  was lost  when the appeal in the High Court was dismissed in  consequence of the review judgment. It is true that the  Bench while  admitting  the  review  petition had confined  its scope but once it found that the excommunication was  invalid for  violation of principles of natural justice and question having been raised that the ordination  of defendant  no.1 (that is catholico) as Malankara Metropolitan was invalid  he  was  the Malankara trustee. Justice  Chatfield with  whom Justice Pillay agreed that,  'he  (that  is catholicos)  did  not forfeit these positions afterwards by any heresy or schism. The meeting of the Malankara  Association  which  removed  the 5th  & 6th defendants (that  is  Patriarch) was  presided over  by the Malankara Metropolitan and the reason given in the original judgment of  this court   for holding  that their removal was illegal cannot therefore stand'. On these  findings it was held :

"In the result therefore by reason of the  decision on  the  contentions as to natural justice and  apostacy the appeal must fail quite apart from the decision of the other questions  in dispute in  this suit.  It would  not be necessary to consider these other questions even if it were open to this court to do so in view of the orders already referred to."

The effect  in law  of this  order, on review, was that the finding  recorded by the High Court on the authenticity of the canon etc. in its original order ceased to be operative. But the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that since the Bench which admitted the review petition had restricted its scope and made it subject to the findings recorded on the authenticity of the canon and the power of the Patriarch to ex-communicate without any intervention by  the Synod,  the findings  recorded on these aspects were  not destroyed  in consequence  of  the  order passed on  the review  petition.  The  submission  does  not appear to  be correct  either legally  or factually.  When a reivew petition  is entertained and notice  is issued by a court it  is open to it to restrict the scope of hearing but once the petition is  heard and the court is satisfied that the order  under review was erroneous at the fact of it then it is  not precluded from allowing the petition was admitted and the Catholicos were  restricted from  re-opening  other points, an  application was  filed on their behalf which was rejected  but while  rejecting  the application it was observed, `if  it is found that any of these questions is so legally connected  with the  questions relating  to natural justice that  the latter  questions cannot be properly dealt with without  considering such  excluded questions  then for this  purpose and for this purpose alone the excluded questions may be considered'. This observation of Chatfield, J. was concurred by  other judges also. And when the review petition was  heard on merits the court was of the opinion, `these (These) orders did  not prevent the defendants (that is Patriarch)  from relying  on contentions  not expressly found in their favour in the original judgment and they have in fact relied on the contentions previously set up by them that the defendants 1 to 3 have become aliens to the faith of Syrian  Jacobite Church  and for  this reason  alone are capable of  acting as  trustees. The plaintiffs on the other hand have  failed to  show that  any of  the questions which have been  declared to be excluded from consideration at the re-hearing are   inseparably connected with these  questions and thereupon  in disposing  of  this  appeal  the  excluded questions will    not be   referred to'.  It is thus clear that the Bench  heard the  appeal not  only on  the questions  on which the review was entertained but even on other questions as the questions  of  natural justice and apostacy were closely connected with and could not be separated from the issues which  had earlier  been closed.   It was  after these observations that  Justice Chatfield  made the observations which have been extracted earlier. To argue, therefore, that the finding  recorded in  the earlier  judgment by  the High Court that Ex. 18 filed by the Patriarch group and relied as authentic canon survived, does not appear to be correct. Even assuming,  although there  appears no  doubt, that the finding  recorded by  the High Court in its  earlier judgment on the authenticity of the canon survived, there is yet another reason to disregard it. If the ex-communication of Dionysius was invalid for violation of principles of natural justice, as was found by the Bench reviewing the order, then  the findings on earlier issues were rendered unnecessary and it is fairly settled that the finding on an issue in  the earlier suit to operate as res judicate should not have  been only  directly and substantially in issue but it should  have been  necessary to  be decided as well. For instance, when  a decision  is taken  in appeal the rule is that it is the appellate decision  and not the decision of the Trial  Court that operates as res judicata. Consequently where a suit is decided both on merits and on technical grounds by the Trial Court, and the appellate court maintains it on technical ground of limitation or suit being not properly constituted then  the decision rendered on merits by the Trial Court ceases to have finality.  In Abdullah Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Dass AIR 1917 PC 201 the Court while considering the expression, `heard and finally decided' in Section 10 of the British Baluchistan Regulation IX of  1896 held that where the suit was dismissed by two courts on  merits but  the decree was maintained  in second appeal because the suit  was not  properly constituted then the finality on merits stood destroyed. In Sheosagar Singh & Ors. v. Sitaram Singh ILR 1897 Cal. Vol.XXIV where parentage of defendant  was decided  in his  favour by the Trial Court but the  High Court maintained the  order as  the suit  was defective the claim of the defendant in the latter suit that the finding  on parentage operated as res  judicata was repelled and it was held, that the question of parentage had not been  heard and finally decided in the suit of 1885. The appeal in  that suit  had put  an end to any finality in the decision of  the first Court, and had not led to a decision on the merits.

The rationale of these decisions is founded on the principle that if the suit was disposed of in appeal not on merits but  for want  of jurisdiction or for being barred by time or  for being defectively constituted then the finality of the findings recorded by the Trial Court on merits stands destroyed as  the suit  having been  found to be bad for technical reasons  it becomes operative from  the date  the decision was  given by  the trial  court thus  rendering any adjudication on merits impliedly  unnecessary. On  the same rationale, once the Royal Court of Appeal allowed the Review Petition and dismissed the appeal as the ex-communication of Dionysius was  contrary to principles of natural justice and he had  not become  heretic then the finding on authenticity of the canon etc.  rendered  in  the original order was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, the finding recorded on the authenticity of the canon  and power  of the Patriarch etc. recorded in  the earlier  order could  not operate as res judicate in subsequent proceedings.

Last but  not the least reason to hold that the finding in the Vattipanam Suit recorded by the High  Court in its original judgment  on canon  etc. could  not operate  as res judicata is where a decree is one of dismissal in favour of the defendants, but there is an adverse finding against him, a plea of res judicata cannot be founded upon that decision because the defendant having succeeded on the other plea had no occasion  to go further in appeal against the adverse finding recorded against him [see Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. vs.  Naresh  Narayan  Roy,  AIR  1922  PC  241  ].  Mr. Parasaran, the learned senior counsel for  the  appellant, urged that  this  is  not  an  absolute  rule as there is mutuality in  res judicata  and even the succeeding party is bound by  the question  decided against him. Reliance  was placed on Mt. Munni Bibi & Anr. vs. Tirloki Nath & Ors., AIR 1931 PC 114, V.P.R.V.Chockelingam Chetty vs. Seethai Ache & Ors., AIR 1927 PC 286, Sham Nath Madan vs. Mohammad Abdullah & Ors., AIR 1967 J&K 85 and Arjun Singh & Ors. vs. Tara Das Ghosh & Ors., AIR  1974 Patna  1.  The two  Privy  Council decisions do not appear to be of any assistance as the first one, Mt. Munni Bibi (supra) , is the leading decision on the principle of  res judicata  amongst co-defendants.  True the Patriarch and Catholico were co-defendants and there was lis too but in view  of the  finding  on  natural justice and apostacy the finding  on   other  issues   was   rendered unnecessary. The  rule of res judicata amongst co-defendants is also govened by those rules which apply to normal rule of res judicata. The decision in Chockalingam Chetty (supra) is an authority for the principle that where an appeal is filed without impleading a defendant through whom other defendants derived title then the  decision in  his favour operates as res judicata between plaintiff and other defendants as well. Similarly, in  the decision of the Patna High Court in Arjun Singh (supra) the primary  question  was  whether  a  party against whom a finding is recorded has got a right of appeal even though  the ultimate  decision was in his favour and it was held  that there  was no bar, but what was necessary was that the finding so recorded should operate as res judicata. On facts it was found that the Appellate Court while maintaining the order of   dismissal of the suit on preliminary issue  recorded findings  on other  issues which were against the plaintiff,  yet  the plaintiff was not entitled to  file an  appeal as the findings on merits which were adverse  to him  could not operate as res judicata. In Sham Nath's  case (supra)  the learned Single Judge rejected the plea  of res judicata raised on behalf of the plaintiff, but while  considering the  alternative argument,  observed that an  adverse finding recorded against  a defendant in a suit dismissed could not operate as res judicata unless the adverse finding  formed a  fundamental part  of  the  decree itself. None of the decisions, therefore, are of any help to the appellant. In any case the findings on cannon or power of Patriarch which  were  the  findings  adverse  to the Catholico could not form  fundamental part  of  the  decree itself, therefore,  it could  not operate  as res  judicata. Truly speaking, the findings  on the  authenticity  of the canon and  the power  of  Patriarch  etc.  recorded  in   the earlier judgment  and the  finding on apostacy and breach of natural justice recorded in the review judgment could not go together. Otherwise  in Moran Mar Bessilios (supra) it would not have  been possible for this Court to come to a finding that the  findings recorded on Issue Nos. 14, 15, 16 and 19 in the Vettipanam Suit operated as  res  judicata  in the Samudayam Suit.  The finding  recorded by the learned Single Judge  and  the Division Bench, therefore, that, `the decision in  XLI T.L.R. that Ext.18 there in (Ext.BP in the Samudayam case and Ext.B161 in these cases) is the version of Hudaya canons accepted as binding on the Malankara Church has not become  concluded  and  does not operate as  res judicata between the parties, is well founded.

Could the    finding on  the authenticity of the canon be relied as  a precedent?  For that  it must fall either under Section 42 or Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 42 which makes any  judgment  relating  to  public  nature admissible itself  provides  but  `such judgments  are not conclusive proof of that which they state'. Section 43 makes a judgment admissible if existence of such a judgment is in issue. In  Kumar Gopika Raman Roy vs. Atal Singh & Ors. AIR 1929 PC 99, it  was held that `the Indian Evidence Act does not make finding of  fact arrived at on the evidence before the court  in one  case evidence  of that fact in  another case'. In  Benode Lal  vs.  Secretary  of  State,  AIR  1931 Calcutta 239  where the law was  clearly explained,  it was observed, `when an appeal  is taken against a decree, the decree of  the lower  gets  merged  in  the  decree  of  the Appellate Court  and so the judgment  of the trial court is not final  adjudication on  the point  in issue between the parties in  the suit'.  The Court further observed that even assuming that, `the existing judgment may be relevant, but the truth of it, by which it is understood, the decision of the Judge and  the opinion  expressed  by  him,  is  not relevant'. Applying  these  principles once  the  appellate judgment was  set aside,  the appeal  was dismissed  and the order of the  trial  court  was  maintained,  the  findings recorded on canon etc. in the appeal could not be relied.

That is  why when    the suit  was filed in 1938, that is the Samudayam Suit, the parties joined issue, once again, on the authenticity of the canon and the Court framed the issue as to  which was  the correct  and genuine version. No issue about  res  judicata was raised  by the Patriarch. Coincidentally same  story was  repeated,  the   Trial  Court accepting the version filed  by the Patriarch. But when the matter came  to this  Court in 1959 it while considering the objection of  Patriarch that  by inserting  Clause 5  in the Constitution the  Catholicos were guilty of heresy as it was contrary to  the authentic  version  produced  by  them  did observe that  for deciding  this aspect it was necessary to decide the  issue  which  related  to authenticity  of the version. Since this Court  had  not  recorded  any finding itself on the authenticity  of the  canon the dispute again arose, when  these suits  were filed, about the authenticity of the canon and  the findings  and conclusions recorded in earlier suits  that is the Vattipanam Suit and the Samudayam Suit and whether any one of them operated as res judicata. It has  already been  explained why the findings recorded in Vattipanam Suit could not  operate as res judicata. Nor the finding could be treated as binding precedent.

Can the same be said about the finding in the Samudayam Suit? It  is not  disputed that      the Trial  Court  not  only framed Issue  No.13 but even recorded specific finding that the canon  produced by the Patriarch  group was not the authentic version.  But   its  binding effect  was  rendered nugatory both  according  to  the  Division  Bench  and  the learned counsel for the  appellant because  when this Court restored only  the decree  of the  Trial Court and not the judgment then the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be   taken to  be binding  or final. Two legal questions, therefore, arise  one, whether the authenticity of the canon was directly  and substantially  in issue and second the effect of restoration of the decree of the Trial Court. The first was  answered by  this Court itself while adjudicating upon the  plea advanced  on behalf of the Patriarch group to support the judgment of the High Court. To appreciate it, it is appropriate to extract Issue No. 13 which reads as under:

"13. Which  is the  correct and genuine version  of the  Hoodaya  Canons compiled  by Mar Hebraeus? Whether it is the book marked as  Ext. A or the book Marked as Ext. XVIII in O.S.91 of 1088."

Issues   Nos.19 and  20 related  to as to whether the defendants, that is, the Catholicos formed themselves into a separate Church and whether the acts mentioned under the Issues constituted separation. This Court did not permit the appellants, that  is, Patriarchs to support the order of the High Court  on the  ground that insertion of Clause 5 in the Constitution of  1934 was  contrary to canons, as it was not raised in the pleadings. Nor did the Court find any merit in the submission  that Issues  Nos.13 and 16 which related to loss of  status as  members of the Church was wide enough to include it.  But it  held that reference to pleadings would indicate why  Issue No. 13 was raised. It further found that to decide  Issue Nos.  16, 17, 19 and 20 it was, `absolutely necessary to  determine which is the correct book of canons, for the  plaintiff (that  is the  Patriarch  Group)  founded their charges on Ex.B.P. - Ex. 18 in O.S. No.94 of 1088 and the defendants  took their  stand on  Ex.26 -  Ex.A in    O.S. No.94 of  1088. Issue  No.13 was  directed to determine that question'. The issue whether  the Hudaya canon filed by the Patriarch Group as Ex.18 in the earlier suit and as Ex.BP in the  present   was  authentic  was  not    only  directly and substantially in  issue  but  as  held by  this  Court was necessary to  be decided  for the  principal  and  the main dispute which arose in that case. In the circumstances it is difficult to agree with the Division Bench, that, `this does not mean that findings were really relevant or necessary for the ultimate  decision in  the litigation  by the  Supreme Court. Issue  Nos. 14 to 17 and 19 and 20 were raised by the plaintiffs and had to be decided'. The Trial Court no doubt observed that it was  not necessary  to decide the issue in the broad  and general sense but it held that the discussion and conclusions in the earlier suit that is Vattipanam Suit on the question of canon did not operate as res judicata. It did make  some observations  which furnished occasion to the appellants to urge that once the Court found that it was not necessary to decide the  larger issue it should not have discussed the  smaller one  only because additional evidence had been led and the counsel had argued the matter. But this submission cannot  be accepted as in view of the observation made by  this Court that the finding on  Issue  No.13 was necessary the  observations lose importance. And the finding if recorded by the Trial Court would have to be accepted and any observation to the contrary ignored. The finding of the Trial Court  on Issue  No. 13  was that no Hudaya canon book approved as  authentic and genuine by the Patriarch was ever supplied to  the Malankara Sabha and the manuscript were of questionable origin and it could not be shown that,

"either in  Malankara or  in Syria or Turkey or other places under the Patriarch or any where in the Jacobite  church outside  Malankara, there is or has been in existence and in use any version of the Hudaya canon corresponding to  Ext. BP  or that such a version has been approved and accepted by the Jacobite church as a correct version". [Emphasis supplied]

In appeal  (The Most. Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. vs. Moran Mar  Bassaelios Catholicos  & Ors.,  1957 KLT  63) the findings recorded  by the Trial Court were not set aside, on merits but  the canon  filed by Patriarch was accepted  as authentic since,  `in the final judgment  after review the question of natural justice alone was considered and decided and this  means that  the earlier finding on the question of canons, which  was a matter directly  and substantially  in issue in  the suit,  was accepted  as correct  even for    the purpose of  the final  decision on  the question  of natural justice. Thus  by implication the finding on the question of the canons  forms an  integral part of the final decision in 45 T.L.R. 116 because, without maintaining that finding, the question of  natural justice  could not have arisen at all'. But that  judgment did   not and could not  operate  as  res judicata for reasons explained earlier. The judgment of the High Court  in The  Most. Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. vs. Moran Mar Bassaelios Catholicos & Ors., 1957 KLT 63. was reversed by this Court. It was held that Catholicose had not become heretic or separated from the Church. But for recording this finidng the decision on Issue No. 13 was as observed by this Court necessary. Therefore, the appellate judgment of this Court precluded the Patriarch from claiming that the  Hudaya Canon filed by them was  authentic as the earlier judgment operated as  bar to this plea as once this Court recorded the  finding  that  the  Catholico had not separated the  finding on  Issue No.  13 stood affirmed even though it was not referred since the finding on the Catholic having become  heretic or separated from the Church depended as observed by this court itself, on finding on Issue No.13. If the finding of the trial court  on  Issue  No.13 was necessary for  deciding whether the  Catholico had become heretic and that finding was affirmed in the review judgment then the  finding of  the High Court in its earlier judgment on the   authenticity of   the canon  cannot stand.  It  could neither be res judicata nor a precedent.

The next  aspect is  the legal effect of restoration of decree of  the Trial  Court. Did it result in revival of the findings on authenticity of the canons as well. The Division Bench held  that, `once an appeal  is disposed of it is the appellate  judgment  which  should  be considered for the purpose of  deciding the question of res judicata. Appellate judgment supersedes the judgment of the trial court, and it is no longer open  to look  into the  judgment of the trial court except  to the  extent it might have been specifically confirmed by  the appellate court. See Benodial Chakravarthy V. Secretary  of State   for India (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 239) and Venkiteswarulu v.  Venkitanarasimham and  others  (AIR 1957 A.P. 557)'.  The reasoning that once  an appeal is taken to higher court  then it is the appellate decree which is final and binding   cannot  be   faulted  with.   But  the  other observation that  the findings of the Trial Court cannot be looked  into  except  to  the  extent  it  might  have been specifically confirmed    is not    wholly correct.  None of the decisions referred  in the  order support  it. The  Calcutta decision has  already been  referred to. In Venkateswarlu v. Venkata Narasimham  & Ors.,  AIR 1957 Andh. Pradesh 557, the High Court  observed, `Now  the appellate  court rested  its conclusion not on the ground that Ex.A-1 was unsupported by consideration but  on the  ground that the transaction was such as not to bind the joint family. Though the trial court found that  the consideration for the sale Ex.A-1 was wholly fictitious, the     appellate court did not give a finding upon that question but confirmed the decree of the trial court on the ground that the sale was for a consideration not binding on the joint family. But what the Division Bench ignored was that the  High Court  did not look into the earlier judgment as the order was upheld on a different ground, therefore, it could not be held that it was express or implied approval of the decision  of the  Trial Court.  In Narayanan  Chetty  v. Kannammai Achi & Ors. ILR Madras 1905 Vol. XXVIII which is more in point it was held:

"An appellate judgment operates by way of  estoppel as regards all findings of the lower Court, which though not referred to in it, are necessary to make the appellate decree possible only on such findings."

This Court  having held that Issue  Nos. 14 to 20 could not have been decided without a decision on Issue No. 13 and set aside the order of the High Court and restored the decree of the Trial  Court the  finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue No.  13 has  to be  read as part of appellate judgment rendered by this Court.

Even otherwise there is no power in canon produced by the Patriarch  for excommunicating a Catholico.  In fact it could not be. All this controversy was raised, with respect, without having   regard to  it that  the canon framed in 13th Century could  not  have  provided  for excommunication  of Catholico  of  East  who  was  himself   visualised  as high spiritual authority no doubt lower in hierarchy to Patriarch of Antioch  but otherwise not subordinate to him. In absence of any such express provision in the canon, the Patriarch of Antioch could not exercise  this power as even  if it was there it did not mention Catholicos. Who could exercise this power is  not necessary to be   gone into. Suffice it to say that  where scriptures are silent the courts cannot substitute their own opinion but when the excommunication of high spiritual authority is involved which, as seen earlier, has serious  repercussion not  only on the individual status of the man but also of religious society,  then  such  an action by  a general  body of  ecclesiastics like a properly requisitioned Synod of all groups may have that sanctity which may compel that courts to stay its hands. But the synod summoned at Damascus was certainly not empowered to excommunicate.  There is  one additional  feature in this case that Clause 5 of the Constitution framed in 1934 read as under:

5. "The  Canon accepted  by this church is the Hudaya canon of Bar-Hebreaus (This is  the Canon that has been printed in Paris in 1890)."

This Constitution has been upheld by this Court in Moran Mar Basselious  (supra).   It  is now  binding on the Syrian Christians. Any action taken against the respondent contrary to it could not have been upheld.  Religious persons in all religions have been men of great learning and  character. Spiritual superiority emanates from purity of character. Any person elected or nominated to such high spiritual office as Catholicate  of East could not be subjected  to ex-communication. That  is why  the Canons did not contain any provision. The entire proceedings of ex-communication, therefore, were unsustainable. If  the spiritual heads  of such high  stature start ex-communicating each other, it may not be conducive for the religious order. That is why even though the  Sultan of  Turkey withdrew  the Firman issued in favour of  Abdul Messiah,  the court  in absence of any material to show that such withdrawal resulted in deprivation of his spiritual superiority refused to act upon it.  Apart from  it,  once  a Constitution  for  Malankara Association was framed, accepted  and upheld by the Court, the ex-communication,  if any,   could be in exercise of that power only.  The power to ex-communicate can be exercised by a spiritual  head either  when the scriptures specifically permit it  or it  is in respect of  the  authorities  which function under   him and are subordinate  to it. Normally in religious matters  such decisions  depend either on the text and if there is no text on the Constitution of the trust or on convention  developed in course of time. From the history of  Orthodox  Syrian Church, it  appears such important decisions are  taken by  the Synod that is a general body of bishops, vicars,  clergies etc.   and, therefore,  before ex-communication can  be held  to be  valid  two things were required to  be proved, one, that such power existed either in the spiritual head or in the general body and the power was exercised  in respect of a person or holder of an office for  whom  it  could  be  exercised.  It  has  already been indicated that in consequence of Ex.A-14 the Kalpana issued by Abdul  Messiah the  entire power,  spiritual or temporal, which  was exercised  by  the  Patriarch  of  Antioch was conferred on  the Catholico  of the  East. The only relation which was  to be observed in future was the communion of the two.  In fact if the history is traced from the Mulunthuruthy Synod held  in   1876  to  1912 then  it  is apparent that Catholicate of the East  was not  treated as subordinate to the Patriarch  of Antioch.  He exercised  same spiritual and temporal powers as Patriarch but with respectful communion. The ex-communication  thus  cannot  be upheld  canonically, traditionally or constitutionally. It was violative of the norms which are mandatorily required to be observed conventionally.

Having  dealt with ex-communication, the controversy about  spiritual  and  temporal powers  of  the Patriarch and  Catholicos, their  inter-relationship and the extent to which they have become final by earlier decisions, particularly Moran  Mar Basselios (supra) and operate as res judicata, may  be examined.  The pleadings  of  the  parties giving rise  to various issues and  the questions framed by the Division Bench and answered by it have been extracted in extenso. The  crucial issue that had been argued was whether the direction of this Court in Moran Mar Basselios (supra) that the  judgment of the Kerala  High Court is set aside, the decree  of the  trial court dismissing the suit must be restored', resulted in restoring the decree and not the judgment, therefore, any finding recorded in that suit could not operate  as res judicata. In Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Sm. Deorajin  Debi &  Anr. (1960)  3  SCR  590 this court insisted on  finality in  the strict  sense of the term and observed as under :

"The very  fact that  in future litigation it will not be open to either of the parties to challenge the correctness of the decision on matter finally decided in a past litigation makes it important that in the earlier litigation the decision must be final in the strict sense of the term".

This was  affirmed by  a Constitution  Bench in  The  Mysore State Electricity  Board vs. Bangalore Woollen,  Cotton and Silk Mills  Ltd. &  Ors. 1963  supp. (2)  SCR 127 and it was observed :

"It is  well  settled  that  in order to decide whether a  decision in an earlier litigation operates  as  res judicata, the court  must  look  at the nature of the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually decided  in it.......it  is indeed true that what becomes  res judicata is the "matter" which  is actually decided and not the reason which leads  the  court  to decide the 'matter'".

These  observations   are   well   settled   and   reiterate established principle  laid down by the courts for the same, sound and general purpose for which the rule of res judicata has been  accepted, acted,  adhered and applied, dictated by wisdom of  giving finality  even at the cost of absolute justice. In  a recent  English decision  - Ampthill  Peerage Case, [1976]  2 All  England Law Reports p. 411, finality at cost of  fallibility has been graphically described at pages 423 and 424 thus :-

"Our forensic system, with its machinery of  cross-  examination  of witnesses and forced disclosure of documents, is characterised by a ruthless investigation of truth. Nevertheless, the law recognises that the process  cannot go  on indefinitely. There  is a fundamental principle of English law (going back to Coke's Commentary on Littleton) generally expressed by   a  Latin  maxim which can be translated:  'It is  in the  interest of society that there should be some end to litigation'. This fundamental principle finds expression  in many forms. Parliament has passed  Acts (the latest only  last year)  limiting the same within which actions at law must be brought. Truth   may  be  thus shut out, but society considers that truth  may be bought at too high  a price, that truth bought at such  expense  is  the negation of justice.  The   great American Judge, Story,  J. delivering the judgment  of the Supreme   Court of the United    States in  Ball v.  Morrison called the first of there Acts of limitation a statute of repose :  and in England Best  CJ called  it  'an  act of peace' (A'Court  v.  Cross).  The courts of equity, originally set up  to make good deficiencies  in the  common law,  worked out for themselves  a parallel doctrine.  It  went by the technical name of laches. Courts of equity would  only give  relief to those who pursued their remedies with promptitude. Then, people   who have long enjoyed possession,  even if they cannot demonstrate a legal title, can rarely be dispossessed. Scottish  law goes even further than English : delay in  vindicating a  claim will  not only bar the  remedy but actually  extinguish the right. But the  fundamental principle  that it  is in  society's interest that  there should  be some end to litigation is  seen most characteristically in the recognition by our   law--by every system of law--of the  finality  of a  judgment.  If  the judgment has  been obtained  by fraud or collusion it is considered  a nullity and the law provides machinery whereby its nullity can be so established.  If the judgment  has been obtained in  consequence of some procedural  irregularity,  it may sometimes  be set  aside.   But such exceptional cases conclude the  matter. That, indeed, is one of  society's purposes in  substituting the law suit for the  vendetta....And once  the final appellate court has pronounced  its judgment, the parties  and   those who claim through them are concluded, and if the judgment is as to the status  of  a person, it   is called a judgment in rem and  everone must  accept it. A line can thus  be drawn   closing the  account between the  contestants.  Important though the issues may be, how extensive so ever  the evidence, whatever the eagerness for further fray, society says;  'We  have    provided courts in which your rival contentions  have been heard. We have provided a code of law by which they  have been  adjudged. Since judges  and juries are fallible human beings, we have provided appellate  courts which do their  own fallible best, to correct error.  But  in the  end you must accept what has been decided. Enough  is enough, And   the    law    echoes  :  res judicata, the  matter is  adjudged'. The judgment creates an  estopel  - which merely means  that what has been decided must be  taken to be established   as  a fact, that the decided  issue cannot be reopened by those who are bound by the judgment, that  the   clamouring  voices must be  stilled, that the bitter waters of civil contention (even though channeled into litigation  must  be allowed to subside". [emphasis supplied]

Such is the principle     of finality.  True that the question must have been adjudicated stricto senso as observed by this Court.  Conclusiveness according  to  the  learned  counsel applied to  decree and  not the  judgment. For reasons given while discussing the authenticity of canons, it is difficult to agree that once decree of the trial court was resiwred it did not  result in  making the     findings an  effective which were basis  of the  decree, except  to    the  extent  it     was expressly or impliedly set abld by this Court.

Therefore, the  judgment of  this Court  in  Moran     Mar Basselios (supra)  would preclude the parties from agitating those issues  which  have  been concluded.  Effect  of   the judgment delivered  by this  Court in  1958 on the rights of Catholicos was twofold, one  their status  was defined   and two,  their  relationship  with      Patriarch  of     Antioch           was explained. What  stands out  clearly from the decision after decision rendered  right from  1899  to  1959  is  that   the Patriarch of  Antioch is  the spiritual       head of  the Syrian Orthodox Church.  It was  held so  clearly in  the appellate judgment of  the Royal Court of Appeal. It was reiterated in Court  of   Appeal  judgment   delivered  in  1905.  In   the Interpleader Suit  filed by the Secretary of State the claim of Catholicos was upheld. The findings recorded therein were held to  operate as  res judicata  in  Moran  Mar  Basselios (supra) which  arose out  of a    suit filed  by the Patriarch Group as  far back  as 1938. The claim of the Patriarch that the Catholicos   had become heretics and ceased to be members of the    Syrian Orthodox Church, was repelled. The Court held that the  reduction of     power of the Patriarch of Antioch to 'vanishing point',  ipsofacto did  not constitute heresy nor it amounted  to voluntary  separation of  setting up  a     new Church. But  the most vital finding was that the creation of Catholicate of   the East  by Abdul  Messiah, the disentitled Patriarch of  Antioch,    by  Kalpana,  Exhibit  A-14  (latter order) issued  in  1912  was  not  invalid.  The  result  of creation  of  Catholicate  of  East  with  power  to  ordain metropolitan and  perform all those functions which could be performed by  Patriarch Antioch  was that even the spiritual power which  was held  to  be  vesting  in  him  in  earlier judgments stood  reduced to 'vanishing point'. What is meant by this expression shall be explained later. The verdict was accepted by  the Patriarch  himself when  he issued Kalpana- Exhibit A-19  after the  Supreme  Court  decision  to  bring peace.  The specific  objection on  behalf of the Patriarch that  "the   re-establishment  of  the Institution of the Catholicos in  the East   in Malabar having jurisdiction over India, Burma and Ceylon" was "different from the Catholicate that  was  the    subject-matter  of  Interpleader  Suit"  was repelled by this Court in Moran Mar Basselics (supra) and it was observed at page 48 as under :-

"We do  not think   there is any substance whatever  in this  contention.  A reference  to paragraphs   30 and 31 of the written   statement clearly indicate that  the       institution  of Catholicate, which is  relied upon by the defendants,  is no other  than   the Catholicate established  in   Malabar      in   1088  by  Patriarch Abdul Messiah".

Relevant clauses  of 1934  Constitution declaring the status of Patriarch  and Catholicate  in the  Malankara Church are extracted below :-

"1. The Malankara Church is a division of the Orthodox Syrian Church and the Primate of the Orthodox Syrian Church is the Patriarch.

 

 2.  The Malankara Church was founded by St. Thomas the Apostle and is included in the Orthodox Syrian Church of the East and the Primate of the Orthodox Syrian  Church of the East is the Catholicos".

The basis for it was the Kalpana issued in 1913 , the relevant portion of which is reproduced:

"We commend you into the hands of Jesus Christ, our Lord, the Great Shepherd of the flock. May He keep you ! We rest confident that  the Catholicos and Metropolitans -Your shepherds - will fulfil all your wants. The Catholicos, aided by the Metropolitans, will ordain  melpattakkars, inaccordance with the Canons of Our Holy Fathers and consecrate Holy Morone.  In your Metropolitans is vested the sanction and authority to install a catholicos, when a catholicos dies. No one can resist you in exercise of this right and, do all things properly, and in conformity with precedents with the advice of the committee, presided over by dionysius, Metropolitan of Malankara. We beseech our Lord Jesus that Ye faint not in your true faith of Saint Peter, on which is built, the Holy Catholic  and Apostolic Church. What we enjoin your true love is that the unlawful conduct of a usurper, may not induce you to sever that communion which is the bond of love connecting you with the Apostolic Throne of Antioch".

Relevant portion of Exhibit  A-19 issued by Patriarch after the decision of the Court read as under :-

"To bring  forth peace  in the Malankara church we hereby accept with pleasure Mar Baselious Gheevarghese as Catholicose".

The combined reading of these documents along with the findings recorded by this Court  in  Moran Mar Basselios (supra), thus, leaves no doubt that Catholicate of East whether due to disuse of the Catholicate which, undisputedly, existed at Tigris or because of creation of a new one by the  Kalpana of 1912 or for any other reason did come into existences. The power and jurisdiction to be exercised by such Catholicate is spelt out from the Kalpana A-12 and A-13 and  the Constitution of 1934. In fact, going by the history it was nothing new or unusual as it has already been narrated that even in the first Eccuminical Councial When Patriarch of Antioch  was  created, the Catholicate of the East was also created and he was entrusted with the power and prerogative to manage the affairs of Eastern Churches subject to that Patriarch  of Antioch was  common and could exercise all the functions. Then from 1654 to 1800 the ordination of Bishops in Malabar used to take place by the delegates of the Patriarch.  Even though after  1840, i.e., the Cochin Award, the individual persons went to Antioch and got themselves  ordained which was accepted as well, but due to its disuse and in any case after issuance of Kalpana in 1912 and framing of the Constitution the controversy arose whether the supremacy in spiritual matters also was not reduced to 'vanishing point'. It was negatived by the Court as it was held that it was not so and nor any separate Church came into existence. The documents which have been referred earlier if properly construed and the course of activity, thereafter, is studied in correct perspective, then the Syrian Church in Malabar and the Patriarch of Antioch, the two authorities with nearly same spiritual powers, one local and the other at Syria entered into relationship of happy communion between the two. This communion meant that each was supreme, but if both of them were present then it was the Patriarch of Antioch who was higher in the hierarchy. In religious orders the two supreme authorities one highest and the other higher without the latter being subordinate is not unknown. This was the change in the power and prerogative of Patriarch as compared from 325 A.D. where he had the supreme power.  But  this change has been recognised, accepted and acted upon.  Further, now the relationship is governed by a Constitution which has been held to be valid.

This was  fairly observed. Between 1912 to 1970 four Catholicos were appointed, the  first B. Paulose I by Abdul Messiah in 1912, second Basselius Gheevarghese I in 1924, third in 1929 after the Vattipanam Suit, fourth Mar Ougen I in 1964. What is significant is that second and third were not installed by or with the consent of Patriarch. And the fourth was installed after the judgment of this Court in Moran Mar Basselios (supra) by the Malankara Synod presided over by the Patriarch Yakub III. But what led to filing of suits by members of the Catholico group and the Catholico himself and successors-elect was the wrongful consecration by the Patriarch of Paulose Athanasius on  3.9.1973  (the first ordination  by the Patriarch after 15 years). Original Suit No.274 of 1973 filed in the District court was numbered as O.S. No. 2/79  in the  High Court. The suit was filed as Paulose Athanasius  had never  been elected by the Malankara Association and, therefore, was not entitled to function as Metropolitan in the Malankara Church. In view of the findings recorded  by the  Travancore Royal Court of Final Appeal pronounced on July 12, 1889 that a Metropolitan of the Jacobite  Syrian Church could be a native of Malabar consecrated by the Patriarch or the delegates and accepted by the people to be entitled  to be spiritual and temporal head of the local Church, which finding was endorsed by this Court in 1958, the suit was filed to prevent Athanasius from interfering with administration of the Malankara Church and any of its constituent diocese including the Kottayam Diocese, as  he was  neither qualified nor entitled to be appointed. Since the Patriarch ordination  created the apprehension and the defendants threatened to act on strength of his ordination from the Patriarch of Antioch the Court granted an injunction in October 1973 restraining him from interfering in the administration of the Malankara Church. As a sequel to this injunction a show cause notice was issued on 30th January, 1974  by the Patriarch against the first plaintiff levelling various charges and describing the action of the plaintiff as uncanonical and a challenge to the authority of the Patriarch.  The matters thereafter grew worse  and when the Patriarch ordained two more bishops the  Catholico Mar Ougen I and Catholico-elect  Mathew Athanasius filed  Suit No.  142/74 which  was re-numbered in the High Court as O.S. No. 4/79 once again protesting against the direct ordination by the Patriarch of bishops not accepted by the Malankara Association.  In this manner nearly 8 suits came to be filed by the Catholico Mar Ougen I along with his successor-elect Mathew Athanasius. The main defence in the suits apart from others was that the plaintiff had  been ex-communicated. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not find any merit in the claim that  after the death of first plaintiff the third plaintiff who was successor-elect was not entitled to continue the suit.  It was held that they were not apostate and aliens to the Jacobite faith and the decision of the Universal Episcopal Synod and the Syrian Orthodox Church held from 16.6.1975 was not in accordance with the rule of the Church. The judgment thus in Moran Mar Bassilios (supra) and the findings recorded by the trial court to the extent it was not set aside by this Court, operates as res judicata.

Two more issues remain, one the nature of Parish Churches whether they are congregational, episcopal, voluntary association or autonomous bodies, public charities or private charities and their relation with the Malankara Association;  second, legal status of the Patriarch of Antioch whether he is a corporation sole as argued by Ms. Lily Thomas, the learned counsel for the intervener, and if so, his rights, privileges and prerogative. Taking up the issues of Parish Churches and whether they are autonomous units, the constitution and the status of the Parishes may be discussed first.

A Parish Church is a, 'district committed to the charge of one incumbent having the cure of souls in it'. [Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.14 para 534]. 'The ancient parishes appear to have been gradually formed between the 7th and 12th or 13th Centuries.  Their boundaries seem to have been originally identical with or determined by those of manors, as a manor very serfdom extends over more than one of these parishes, although in  many cases one parish contains two or more manors. Besides being ecclesiastical units, ancient parishes have been at different perious, and in many cases still  are, administrative  areas for various civil purposes, although the boundaries for parishes for civil purposes have in many cases been altered under statutory authority'.  [Halsbury's Laws of  England  Vol.14 para 535].  'The word 'Parish' was in use as early as the third century, but it was at that time equivalent to the term Diocese (which see). In primitive time the diocese of a bishop was neither more nor less than what is now called a parish; and even when the jurisdiction of bishops had become extensive, the diocese long continued to be called the parish. Afterwards the word was limited to the district attached to a single church over which a presbyter presided, who was hence called  parochus. .... During this formation of the parochial system, the ...... measures were adopted to retain these churches in a state of dependence on the mother or cathedral church. The diocesans, however, were often obliged to allow the parish churches a greater degree of independence than they were of their own accord willing to concece to them...... for  sometime after the first introduction of the parochial system, the revenues of a diocese continued to be regarded as a whole the distribution of which was subjected to the bishop; that is to say, whatever obalations or the like were made in parish churches were paid into the treasury of the cathedral church as the one heart of the body and thence distriouted among the cleray after the claims of the parish had been satisfied [emphasis supplied].  This arrangement remained generally in force until the end of 5th century, many parish Churches having in the meantime greatly increased in wealth by means of bequests and donations and having come into the receipt of considerable obalations. ......... But in the course of  the sixth  century the  revenues of the pareshial clarc came to be considered simply as cheir own, the bishops being obliged  to rele cheir hold of them  Faiths of the World, by thems  Gardner p.617

Parish Church,  thus, is  an  ecclesiestical  authority operating in  a specific  area. But  they are of a religious order. Their  autonomy, their  financial powers, their administrative control have been thus different in different ages depending on the terms of creation of the trust, the purpose and objective of its establishment, the personality of the person occupying  it, the financial strength  of it etc.  The  Syrian Churches,  as the  history narrated earlier indicates, were established for religious worship and public charity and  every church,  small or  big, claimed  that its spiritual  head was the Patriarch of Antioch.  DW-28- Gheevarghese Moran Mar Basselios II who was ordained as Metropolitan by Abdul Messiah and examined in  O.S. No. 111/1113 and on whose testimony reliance was placed by the appellant, stated  that the Churches are  established after obtaining sanction of the Metropolitan and the Government. When the Malankara Association was formed in the Mulunthuruthy Synod  a resolution was passed constituting 8 of the priests assemshed there and 16 of the laymen of the first class with the ruling Metropolitan as President entrusted with the complete responsibility of management for every matter connected with the common religious and communal affairs  of the entire Syrian community. The other resolution passed was that the 'committee shall have liberty to collect other amounts as well in addition to the amounts above mentioned to cause its increase, to make sub-committees and to do everything beneficial'. In respect of administration of property it was resolved that 'for altering the existing rules relating to the administration of the property belonging to, the church and to the Syrian community, and for enacting new laws for the same, for examining and approving the accounts of the various churches, for confirming the epithopas (stuarts of the Church) of the respective churches decided by the Yogam, for printing the  books useful  and necessary for the community, for repairing the churches which have fallen into disrepair, for building  new churches  and for  erecting  schools, the above said committee shall have full responsibility'. The Committee was further entrusted with responsibility to collect and  send the  "Ressissa" due  to His Holiness the Patriarch, to collect the 'kaimuthu' and other income due to the metropolitans from the  churches and in case it was not sufficient to  find other  ways for  the same  and also for maintenance of  the Dayaras (Monasteries), to effect payment of salaries  to the  vicars according to the capacity of the parish and  pay the  salary of the Secretary  and others. Thereafter when the Constitution of 1934 was made a full chapter was devoted to the Parish church.  The detailed procedure was given about the membership, maintenance of register, the payment of subscription, the convening of the Parish Assembly meeting, the duration at which the Assembly should meet  in a  year and the manner in which the fund was to be spent.  It was also provided that the Vicar shall report to the diocesan  Metropolitan about the election of the Parish Committee which shall not have any authority to take any decision in matters relating to religion which shall be referred to the Diocesan  Metropolitan. Right of appeal was also provided to Metropolitan. Clause 37 provided that when  the Diocesan Metropolitan came  to the Church on his Parish  visit he  shall sign  the register maintained in every Parish of moveable and immoveable properties. All this indicates that the Parish Churches were  under the control and supervision of the   Metropolitan. This Constitution was amended in  1967 with  participation of Patriarch group and apart from reiterating what was said in 1934 it was provided in Clasue 120 that Vicar of every Parish Church shall collect Ressissa'  at the  rate of  2 annas  every year from every male  member who has passed the age of 21 years and shall send the same to the Catholico.  The  Constitution further contemplates entire hierarchy in which the Catholico and Metropolitan were placed at the highest. From the scheme unfolded by the Resolution passed in the Mulunthuruthy Synod read with  the Constitution  it appears every Syrian Parish Church even though established independently has necessarily to  have relation with the Malankara Association. The relationship between the two that is, the Parishes and the Malankara Association has been subject matter of consideration in  every decision  which came  up before the courts. Even in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen the issues framed were  whether Parish Churches were independent and autonomous units and whether the administration and conduct of their affairs and their assets were to be under the immediate control, direction and supervision of the Diocesan Metropolitan as provided for in the Constitution  and whether vicars, priests  and  office bearers in  Parish Churches had to be approved and appointed by him or the Metropolitan had only spiritual supervision and no temporal control.  Both these issues were decided by the learned  Single Judge  in favour of the Parish Churches. But the Division Bench after elaborate discussion of law and fact held,  'Parish Churches'  were' not congregational  or independent' and  the Constitution is valid and binding on the Malankara Association, community  diocese as well as Parish Churches and Parishes.

Whether the  finding is well founded or not and whether the Division  Bench was justified in further recording the finding that the Malankara Church was episcopal to a limited extent, only, shall be adverted presently, but before doing so it is necessary to deal with one submission  of  Mr. Parasaran on  this aspect  at the  outset,  which was more preliminary in nature, as to whether the relief sought by the plaintiffs that the Malankara Church was episcopal in character was not a Union or Federation of Autonomous Church Units and was governed in its administration  by the Constitution of the Malankara Church could not be granted in absence of impleadment of  each Parish Church. Prima facie the submission appeared attractive but a closer scrutiny of the pleading demonstrates that the nature of Parish Churches was very  much in  issue of which parties were aware and the suits were tried on the footing whether Parish Churches were autonomous or  not. In any event, it is worthwhile referring to the pleading.

In paragraph 11 onwards of the Plaint (in Original Suit No.142/74 re-numbered  as Original Suit No.4/79 in the High Court) it was averred that the Malankara Church consisted of an aggregate  of about 15 lakhs of worshippers worshiping in more than 1000 Parish Churches. A list of churches was appended to the Plaint.  It was claimed that each  Church founded became a constituent of the Malankara Church a well established religious community administered under the authority of the Malankara Metropolitan.  It was claimed that the Parishioners  of each Church were entitled to the benefits from the Church and its properties. The Malankara Church was  neither a Union with a Federation  of Congregational Units  but a  Church with a unique solidarity derived from apostolic succession and authority of Malankara Metropolitan and  the doctrines and creed  followed by the Church.  It  was alleged that the  Constitution of  1934 was binding on every Church and the temporal, ecclesiastical and spiritual powers of  the administration vested in  the Malankara Metropolitan who invariably is a native of Malankara or  elected  by  a  group  by the community.  In paragraph 19  it was  averred that defendants were impleaded in their individual capacity and as representatives of Malankara Jacobite Syrian Christian Association.  Permission to sue in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 was also sought.

In the  written statement filed by different defendants the entire claim of the Catholicos was denied. The averments went to the extent  of denying establishment or revival of Catholicate in Malabar.  The  basic claim was that the Catholicate of  East was deputy to the Patriarch of Antioch. It was alleged that  Syrian Christian Association formed at the  Mulunthuruthy Synod was given the power to take decisions on  common matters of the community but it was not vested with any power over the individual Parish Churches or their administration. It was  alleged that no Parish Church has surrendered their powers of administration to the said Association. It  was claimed  that Parish Churches and their properties belonged  to the respective Parishioners and the plaintiffs or  the hierarchy  in the Malankara Church had no manner of  right, title, possession or management over these Churches. It  was denied  that the Parish Churches and other Churches mentioned in the list were constitutents of the Malankara Church and that the Malankara Metropolitan had the authority to administer all those Churches. Written statements were filed. The  defendants raised all possible defence even contrary to earlier decision. Different written statements were filed by different defendants including the two, that is, Knanaya Association and Evangelistic Association which were impleaded on their own instance. These averments would indicate that the parties were very much at issue on the question whether Parish Churches were constituents of Malankara Church or not. That is why when applications were filed on behalf of the Parish Churches for being impleaded as party it was rejected and the dispute became final after the High Court held that it was not necessary to implead every Parish Church individually.

It is  too late, therefore, to urge that no declaration on the status of  Parish  Churches  be granted.  No such objection was  taken either  before the learned Single Judge or the  Division Bench. May be that the 1000 Parish Churches were not  impleaded. But  it was a representative suit. Then the suit was for a declaration that the Malankara Church was episcopal in  character and  not a  Union of  Federation  of Autonomous Churches.  It was  not necessary to impleed every Parish Church  as a  party. The question whether  Malankara Church is episcopal or not had to be decided on the pleading of the plaintiff. The defence raised by the defendants, who were ordained  by the  Patriarch of  Antioch, was  that they were the  metropolitans and,  therefore, entitled to protect the interest  of Parish Churches. Moreover  the declaration sought is as a matter of law. No factual dispute arises. The suit was  filed for  enforcement of  this right. Once it was found by this Court in 1958 that the Constitution was validly framed the Catholicos could  not  be denied this declaration. In paragraph 94 of the 1934 Constitution it was provided that,  'the (The)  Prime jurisdiction regarding the temporal ecclesiastical and spiritual administration of the Malankara Church  is vested in the  Malankara Metropolitan subject to  the provisions  of this constitution'. Whether a particular Parish  Church is a member of the Malankara Association is not relevant.  Therefore, the submission that the non-impleadment  of individual  Parishes precluded the court from  granting any  declaration about  the nature and status of Parish Churches, does not appear to be correct.

'Congregationalism' is defined in New English Dictionary of  Historical Principles  (By Sir John  Murray, Vol.III, Part I, page 245) as under:

"A system   of  ecclesiastical polity which  regards all legislative disciplinary and judicial functions as vested in the individual church or local congregation of believers."

'Congregationalism' is defined in  Chambers  Encyclopedia, Vol.IV, page 12 as under:

"Congregationalism is the doctrine held by churches which put emphasis on the autonomy of the individual congregations. Congregationalism has for its sign manual the words of Jesus: 'Where 2 or 3 are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them'."

In Black's Law Dictionary 'Congregation' isexplained thus:

"An  assembly or gathering; specifically, an assembly or society of persons who together constitute the principal supporters of a particular Parish, or habitually meet at the same church for religious exercises."

The word  is explained  in the Faiths of the World Vol.1 at page 589 thus:

"This word, like the term Church (which see) is sometimes used in a more extended and at other times in a more restricted sense. In its widest acceptation, it includes the whole body of the Christian people. It is thus employed by the Psalmist when he says, "Let the congregation of saints praise Him." But the word more frequently implies an association  of professing Christians, who regularly assemble for divine worship in one place under a stated pastor. In order to constitute a congregation in this latter sense of the term, among the Jews at least ten men are required, who have passed the thirteenth year of their age. In every place in which this number of Jews can be statedly assembled, they procure a synagogue Among Christians, on the other hand, no such precise regulation is  found, our  Lord himself having declared, "Wherever two or three are met together in my name, there am  I in the midst of them." Guided by  such intimations of the will of  Christ, Christian sects of all kinds are in the habit of organising congregations though the number composing them may be much smaller than  that fixed by the Jewish Rabbies."

'Episcopal'  is defined in Webster Comprehensive Dictionary to  mean, 'of  or pertaining to bishops. Having a government vested  in bishops; characterised by episcopacy', whereas 'Episcopacy' is defined as under:-

"Government of a church by bishops".

New English  Dictionary of Historical Principles by Sir John Murray, Volume III, explains it to mean:

"Theory of  Church Polity which places the supreme authority in the hands of episcopal or pasteral orders".

'Episcopacy' is  explained in  the Faiths  of the  World  by James Gardner, Volume I, at page 836 as under:-

"that form of church government which recognises a distinction of ranks among the  ministers of religion, having as its fundamental article that a bishop is superior to a presbyter".

'Bishop' in  the same book is defined as under:-

"one who in episcopalian churches has the oversight of  the clergy of a diocese or district".

'Metropolitan' is  defined in  the same book at page 445 as under:-

"the bishop who presides over the other bishops of a province. In the Latin church, it is used as synonymous with an  archbishop. In England, the archbishops of Canterbury and York are both  Matropolitans.... The title was not in use before the council of Nice in the fourth century... The rise of the authority of Metropolitans seems  to have taken place without any distinct interference on the part of the church. The council of Nice was the first to give an express deliverance on the subject, particular with reference to the Alexandrian Church. The sixth canon of that Council ran in these terms: 'Let the ancient custom which has prevailed in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, that the bishop of Alexandria should have authority over all these places, be still maintained, since this is the custom also with the Roman bishop. In like manner, at Antioch, and in the other provinces, the churches shall retain their ancient prerogatives'."

These definitions  of 'congregationalism'  and 'episcopal' have been extracted to give an idea how the expressions are understood as the entire submission of autonomy of the Churches  is based on whether the Parishes are congregational or episcopal.

The basic or essential characteristics as appears from the above definitions and explanation of 'congregationalism' and 'episocpal' is that in the former the authority vests in the congregation whereas in the latter it is controlled by the bishop as he is deemed to be successor of the apostle. That the Syrian Orthodox Church of Malankara accept and acknowledge the theory of apostle succession is beyond doubt.  In Faiths of the World, the word  'Episcopalians' is explained and it is stated that  it is a name given to those who hold that peculiar form of Church government which is called 'Episcopacy'. The  Church of  Rome is Episcopalian in its constitution, and acknowledges the Pope as Universal Bishop, to whom all the various orders of clergy, cardinals, primates, and patriarchs, archbishops and bishops are subordinate... The Armenian church is similar in govenment to the Greek church, their Catholicos being equivalent in rank and authority to the Greek patriarch...  All the ancient Eastern churches, including the Copts, Abyssinians, and others, are  Episcopalian. The church of England is strictly Episcopalian in its ecclesiastical constitution.'  The claim, therefore, that they are congregational cannot be accepted.

Even factually it was not open to the Patriarch to take up this defence. The Canon on which reliance was placed by them and filed as Ex. B-161 dealing with properties and income of  the Churches provided, 'If the valuable souls of the beliain can be entrusted to the (Episcops Bishop) it is quite apt that he bears authority over the property of the church.  Everything should be  administered by his order and be given to the Priests, Decons and those who are in needs'. The resolution in the Mulunthuruthy Synod also accepted this. In the Vattipanam Suit Justice Chatfield in paragraph 15 of the judgment has noticed, it may be stated that both sides admit  that the administration of the temporalities of the Syrian  Jacobite Church  in Malankara  is with the local Metropolitan and  the other  Metropolitans'. That  is why in the Arthat case it was held that the plaintiff churches, that is the Parish  Churches of Arthat were subject to spiritual, temporal and ecclesistical jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of Malankara. Paragraph 95 of 1934 Constitution itself provides that, 'there will be an Episcopal Synod in Malankara'.

Whether a public institution or a public Church unlike private religious places is autonomous or not depends on its trust deed, the intention  of the members who found it, the purpose for which it was established. The establishment of a Church is normally understood as an institution established for public charities.  Its objective is religious and spiritual. Whenever a charity is created it is either public or private.  The latter is for individual, may be for fixed period or  for determinate  person. But public charities are of permanent  character, the  membership of  which keeps  on fluctuating. Lewin on Trust explained a 'charitable trust' thus, 'a  public or charitable trust, on the other hand, has for its object the  members of an uncertain and fluctuating body and  the trust  itself is of a permanent and indefinite character and  is not  confined within the limits prescribed to a settlement upon  a private  trust. These trusts may be said to  have as their object some Purpose recognised by the law rather  than human  beneficiaries. Tudor on Charities at page 131  of 6th  Edn. has  stated thus, `when a charity has been founded  and trusts have been declared, the founder has no power  to revoke,  vary or  add to the trusts. This is so irrespective of   whether the trusts have been declared by an individual, or by a body of subscribers or  by trustees'. That the Parish Churches  were established for promoting ideals of  Syrian Orthodox  or Jacobite  Church has been the consistent claim of both the Patriarch and the Catholicos. Its nature cannot be changed by the persons who are entrusted to  manage it.  They were  episcopal in  character when they  were found, they continue to be so at present and shall remain so in future. The character of public charities from episcopal to congregational  cannot be  changed as  it would be against basic purpose for which these Churches were established. In   Attorney General  v. Pearson & Ors. 1814-23 All England Law Reports p.60 at 63 it was observed as under:

"But if, on the other hand, it turns out that the institution was established for the express purpose of such form of religious worship, or the teaching of such particular doctrines, as the founder has thought most conformable to the principles of the Christian religion, I do not apprehend that it is in the power of individuals, having the management of that institution, at any time to alter the purpose for which it was founded, or to say to the remaining members: `We  have changed our opinions, and you, who assemble  in this place for the purpose of  hearing the doctrines and joining in the worship prescribed by the founder, shall  no longer enjoy the benefit he intended for you unless you confirm to the alteration which has taken place in our opinions'."

Therefore, once these public charities were found whether before the establishment of catholicate or after it their nature could not change.  On the material on record the courts have found them to be so. Therefore, the submission that they are autonomous does not appear to be well founded. Autonomy for  what, religious worship or temporal matters. Former cannot  be pleaded as once a Church was found for religious worship it continued   to be so. The autonomy in temporal matters as claimed appears to be two-fold, one, freedom to disassociate from Malankara Association and second to control and supervise its internal affairs. The first cannot arise. In law it is not open to members of public or  public trust to appropriate  trust properly  for themselves. Under Hill on the Law of Trusts and Trustees has explained it  thus, `However,  the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the association for the time being.  The members for the time being cannot under  the association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then  be no  property held on trust as intended by the testator for  those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the association for the time being'. None of the Parish Churches claim autonomy in the sense that they have changed their faith and belief. Each of them claims that their  spiritual head is Patriarch of Antioch. That is they are the believers and followers of Syrian Church. So are the members of Malankara Association and Catholicate of East. Therefore, the existence or exercise of autonomy for Parishes has  no meaning.  Similarly  the  independence  or autonomy in temporal matters is not of any consequence. The Parishes are bound by the Constitution framed in 1934.

Mr. Parasaran  submitted that  the Malankara Church was from very  ancient times  episcopal to    a limited  extent in spiritual  and     ecclesiastical      matters   but     has     been congregational/autonomous in  temporal matters. It was urged that if    Jacobite Syrian  Orthodox Church  has been  or           was episcopal as  claimed by  the respondents then the Patriarch would have  had control            over  temporal matters  also.   The learned counsel   submitted  that  Malankara  Church  being essentially congregational  it was to be presumed that every Parish Church was an independent Church. The learned counsel criticised  the  Constitution  of  1934  as  the  deliberate departure from  the established  norms and  practice of the Church and  the attempt            by it     to invest  it with episcopal character in temporal matters. The learned counsel submitted that the  custom which was prevalent in the Malankara Church throughout  has been  that  the  Parish  Churches  and   its properties were            administered by  the congregation  that  is Parishioners and in that sense the Malankara Church has been congregational in temporal matters and this well established custom must  prevail even  over the provisions of the canon. It was   urged  that  this  was already recognised  in  the Samudayam suit            by the Trigal Judge and the admission of the Catholicos before  the District   Judge. The  learned counsel submitted that the status of the Parish Churches even before Malankara Synod was independent and if indeed the Church was episcopal in temporal matters there was no necessity for the creation of  an Association  in the  meeting of 1876 for the purpose of  raising funds  since the  Patriarch directly  or through the  Malankara Metropolitan  could have          raised  the necessary finance  from the Parish Churches and above all if the Parish  Churches  were  episcopal  then  where  was            the question of  entering into an Udampadi with every individual Parish Church. The learned counsel submitted that the entire claim of  the respondents  that the entire body of Churches, institutions and  common properties  formed one organic unit to  be   administered  by  the  provisions  of  the  impugned Constitution was  based on  a misrepresentation of the words `Church' and `Sabha' and is contrary to the history, customs and proceedings           and  the  Malankara  Church.  Reliance            was placed on  the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.8 and it was urged that if they were read along with Ex.A-19 and A-20 then they would indicate  that it    did not  result into  bringing into effect    any  voluntary  association.  The  learned  counsel submitted that   if the exchange of Kalpanas are sought to be treated as  legally binding  on individual  Parish  Churches amounting to unification and acceptance of the Constitution on the   basis  that  the  Patriarch  will  bind        the  Parish Churches then necessarily Patriarch will have to be accepted as the supreme ecclesiastical and temporal superior. It was urged that it was so because the Constitution framed in 1934 deals with  all the  three aspects and can be imposed on the Parish Churches            only on  the basis  that they      did not have autonomy in  respect  of  any  one  of    the  three  and   the Patriarch will     have the power to impose such a constitution on the   individual Parish  Churches without  obtaining their individual  consent.   According  to   learned      counsel   if Patriarch had  such a spiritual, ecclesiastical and temporal supremacy such            supremacy could           not only  be in  regard  to Parish Churches            in the Patriarch section but also in regard to the    Churches of the Catholico section. And otherwise the religious beliefs,  practice  etc.  would  be  different  in Parish Churches            in the two sections and there cannot be any unification.  It   was       urged  that  Ex.A-19  could  not  be construed as  a surrender  of the authority which existed in the Patriarch  in favour  of the Catholico as if the Kalpana is construed  as such  then it      would amount  to a change of faith so  far the  Parish Churches  in the Patriarch section were concerned            and on  the principle of religious trust the properties and  the Churches  could  not  go  to  Catholicos section. Minutes  of the meetings held by the Association in 1959, 1962,  1965 and  1970 including  the presence  of           the Patriarch in  the installation        ceremony  of  Mar  Ougen  as Catholico was  placed.  It  was  urged   that  if  these     are construed as  claimed  by  the   respondents  then  it  would inevitably result  in applying the law relating to religious trusts. But  that would   not  be  in  consonance  with    law. According to  learned counsel  on the principle of voluntary association even  if it     is assumed  that they decided to be under Catholico            there was  nothing to    prevent them  in law from opting  out of it. Attention was drawn to various suits filed during this period and the failure of the Catholico to impose their  constitution. In      respect of  presence of  the Patriarch at  the installation ceremony of the Catholico the learned counsel urged that it only strengthened their claim that  Patriarch     was  the  supreme  head  as  a  person  as delegation of  power can  be made  only by  a person  who is superior than the person whom he ordains. In any case if the Patriarch was  authorised to delegate and participate in the installation ceremony  as the  head of     the Syrian  Orthodox Church then  there was nothing in  law to  prevent him from withdrawing it.  The submission            was placed  on yet  another aspect that  the Catholicos  had never    claimed supremacy to the exclusion  of the  Patriarch. But  on the  other hand by their conduct  and action  they accepted  the spiritual     and ecclesiastical supremacy as was clear from various documents where the  Catholico requested the consent of Patriarch for relaxing the  rigour  of  canonical  penances.      The  learned counsel submitted  that the  respondents were  claiming that the  Malankara Association   had   become   autoceohalous. Therefore, applying the principle of religious trusts if the Parish Churches and properties which were originally founded for  the   benefit  of       the  parishioners  who   believed  in uninterrupted apostolic  succession from  St. Peter  through the Patriarch then the use of such Parish Churches and their properties by those who claimed to be Malankara Church would be contrary  to original  faith and  character of  the Sabha (Sabha means  the Church  as a whole) attached to the Parish which are  established for  worship according  to the faith, custom and  practice of the Sabha.  Attention was  drawn to Ex.B-269  and  Ex.A-120  and it  was    claimed  that   the Constitution of these Parishes would indicate that they were part of  the Malankara Church subject to superior authority of the    Diocesan Metropolitan of the Malankara Metropolitan.

The learned counsel submitted that according to the Orthodox teachings the  Church or  Sabha is a body with Christ as its head and  together  they  form   an  integral  whole  and  by consecration a  Parish Church  becomes the  abode of God and becomes a  part of  the Sabha.  Reliance was  placed on  the evidence of P.W.8 and admissions of D.W.2. It was urged that Church being  a public  trust  of  a  religious       nature  the beneficiaries of  which at a time have no right to deal with it as is clear from what has been stated by Lewin on Trusts.

 The  nature   of  public  charities  has  already been explained. None of the submissions appear to have substance. A Church is either episcopal or congregational. It cannot be episcopal in spiritual  matters   and  congregational  in temporal  matters.   That  would   be  against  the basic characteristic of  such  a  Church.  It  would   be  against specific  provisions   in  the Constitution.  The  temporal matters or   administration  of  Churches  flows  from    its establishment for  religious purposes,   namely, `the cure of souls'. Where  a building  is consecrated  as a    Church, `it continues to  exist in   the eye of law  as a church and the body corporate which had  been endowed   in  respect  of  it remains in  possession of  the    endowment  even though the material building  is destroyed'.  Every  Parish  Church  of Malankara acknowledges the  Patriarch of  Antioch  as  the spiritual  head.   They    have    been  playing ressissa to Patriarch. The   ordination, consecration and every spiritual or temporal power has always been exercised by the Patriarch of Antioch  so long it was not decided on basis of the Synod held at  Mulanthuruthy  that  the  Patriarch  was  only    the spiritual  head   and  the  temporal  powers  vested  in  the Metropolitan. This  division of   power could not destroy the basic characteristic of episcopacy. The Church in England is also an  episcopal Church.  In Halsbury's  Laws of  England Vol.14  para   562  the    right    of  Parishioners  has     been described, `to   enter the church remain there for purpose of participating in  divine worship  to have a seat and to obey the reasonable  directions of  the church  to  ordain'.   The property vests   in the    endowment. That is the   fundamental difference in congretational and episcopal. In the former it vests in  the Parishioner.  But in  the latter in endowment. Once it is conceded  that the Syrian Churches are episcopal in character  then the  distinction  between  spiritual     and temporal is  of no  consequence. Therefore,  the property of the Church  vests in the endowment and not the Parishioners. The right  to manage  such property  vests in  the  trustees under the  bye-law subject  to the control by the Catholicos and Metropolitan  in accordance  with the  Constitution. The fact that every Church has its own bye law does not militate against its  nature of   being episcopal as Clause 122 of the Constitution of  1934 itself  provides that,  `byelaws which are not  inconsistent with  the principles contained in this constitution may  be passed  from time to time by the Parish Assembly, the  Diocesan Assembly or the Diocesan Council and may be brought into  force with  the approval of the Rule Committee'. The Parish Churches  are thus governed in their administration by  the Constitution of the Malankara Church. The nature  of relationship  between the  two bodies can be gathered either from the circumstances or from the documents if they are on record. The Resolution of the Mulanthuruthy Synod, the  Constitution of  1934 and  its amendment in 1967 unmistakenly demonstrate  a close link between the Malankara Association and  each Parish Church. A Church is established by followers of a religious faith. The mere establishment  is not  sufficient unless it assures the realisation of  the ultimate goal that is salvation and that could come  only when such a body has a link with the higher spiritual body which religiously is considered to be the one which could  help in permitting a man to achieve the end. It is not    the case  of the appellants that the Parish Churches are independent in the sense that they have no link with any higher spiritual  power. It is their specific case that they claim their  spiritual link  from the  Patriarch of Antioch. The ordination of the Metropolitan-consecrate of Bishop even according to  them has  to be from Antioch. When D.W. 28 was asked whether  after creation of Catholicate the Patriarch ceased to have any power, he stated  'ordaining   a Metropolitan is not a    power. It  is a   bond and duty'. The witness denied  that Patriarch of Antioch was only the head of  the   Jacobite  Church  and  he  had no  power  over  or concerning the  Malankara Church.  Therefore, they  are  not independent and    autonomous in the sense  in which  it    was claimed by  the learned counsel. If it be so and if what has been stated  earlier that  the Patriarch  of Antioch himself created a  Catholico of  the  East  in 1912  with  all   the spiritual powers  then it is difficult to visualise that how the Parish Churches can claim that they are independent and separate  from  the  Malankara Association.  In  Moran Mar Basselios (supra)  it has been decided that the Constitution was framed  after notices  were sent to every Parish Church. Therefore, whether  they attended or not is not material and in any   case  once  the  Constitution  was  framed  and its validity has  been upheld  then under  the provisions of the Constitution the  Metropolitan appointed  by  the  Malankara Association has control over the Parish Churches. It is not necessary to  refer to    various observations  made  in the earlier judgments  by the  courts which undoubtedly indicate that the  Malankara Association  which  was  a  creation  of Malankara Synod and is the representative body that has the right to bind the holy community and all the Churches by its deliberations and actions. The Full Bench of the Royal Court of Cochin  in 1905 held that the Churches and its properties were  subject  to  spiritual,  temporal and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of  the Metropolitan  of Malankara. Even in the very  first  judgment of 1889 it was  held  that,  `once Metropolitan of the Syrian  Jacobite Church was accepted by the people  it would, `entitle him to spiritual and temporal governance of  the local  churches'. In   the Samudayam suit this Court  had observed  that the  whole of  the  Malankara Church was  represented by  the Malankara  Association.   The District Judge whose decree had been restored by this Court, and in   appeal this  Court had not said anything contrary to what was  observed by him, observed, `It cannot therefore be denied that  this Jacobite  `Syrian Association' which was a creation  of   the  Mulunthurn  Synod was  and is the representative body  that has  the right  to bind  the whole community and  all the churches by its deliberations and actions.' The  claim, therefore, that the Patriarch Churches are autonomous and independent in temporal matters cannot be accepted. That would be contrary to the Mulunthuruthy Synod, the decision  in the  Royal Court of Appeal, the Arthat Case and the Constitution of  1934.  A  power  which  vested  in Malankara Association  could not  be denuded  merely because the spiritual  power  of  the  Patriarch  descended  on    the Catholico, who could be Metropolitan as well, on the analogy that if    Patriarch did not have temporal power then it could not be   deemed to  vest in  Catholico. Temporal power always vested in  Metropolitan. It  could not be divested  because even the  spiritual power  came to  be vested  in  him.  The extent of  power also  remains the  same,  namely,  not  to interfere in  day to day administration of a member which is governed by its own bye-laws.

Apart from the Syrian Orthodox Church there are various other churches  such as the Evangelistic Association, the Simhasana churches  the five  churches  established  between 1951 to 1956 and  Malankara Suriyani  Knanaya Samudayan who claimed that  though they  are followers  of Orthodox Syrian Christian tenets  and beliefs but they have been established separately either under the Societies Registration Act or by their own  rules and  their churches  were established     with explicit declaration  that they     were  under  the  spiritual supremacy of  Patriarch of  Antioch  from  whom  the  grace emanates. It was claimed by them that the suits against them were  misconceived  and in  any case some of them, for instance, the  churches established  between 1951  and  1956 having come  into existence after the Constitution of 1934 was framed  by the  Malankara Association  they could not be held to  be under the spiritual or administrative control of the Catholicate  of the   East. Each  of  them  were  subject matter of  separate suit.  The issues were framed separately and the evidence was also led. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench after consideration of the material on record  and examining the finding recorded in the earlier decisions rendered  by the  Travancore Cochin High Court and this Court  in Moran Mar Basselios (supra) had held that except churches of the Evangelistic  Association  and   the Simhasana churches  and St.  Anthony church  the others were under the  Catholico of  the East.  The findings recorded in the case of Knanya Samudayam is subject-matter of Appeal No. 4953 whereas  Appeal No.4954  to  4956 has  been  filed  by Kundara Church and Appeal  No. 4989  has been filed by five churches established  during 1951-56.  The  Catholicos have challenged the   findings of the Division Bench in respect of Evangelistic Association and Simhasana Churches which is the subject-matter of SLP No. 14783-86 of 1991.

The Malankara  Suriyani Knanya Samudayam referred to as `Knanaya Samudayam' traces its origin from one Mar Thomas of Cona and  one Bishop  Joseph who  migrated  along with         400 persons comprising  of 72  families from a place called Cona in 345   A.D. They  claim that  they are  different racially, culturally and    socially from  the Syrian Christians and the membership in  the community  is only by virtue of birth. It is claimed  that the  community all  along kept    its  status separate and  functioned under  the guidance and supervision of spiritual  leadership of  the Patriarch  of  Antioch.  It claimed that      Patriarch  ordained   Mar  Sevoten   as the Metropolitan in 1910 and  Mar Clemis  in 1951  who is still continuing. Attention  was also  drawn to  the   Constitution framed in  1912 and  amended in 1918, 1932,  1939, 1951 and 1959 wherein  the superemacy  of Patriarch  of Antioch  was always offered. Various other   provisions were pointed out and it was urged that it was clear that it was an autonomous church. The  followers of Kundara Church claimed that it was established by followers of Mar Cyrial who had come to India as prelate,  of the  Patriarch of  Antioch who resolved the differences between  Mar Athanasius and M. Dionysius,  but failed in  his attempt due to the Royal Proclamation which was in   operation. It is claimed that it was at the instance of the  Patriarch that the Queen of England issued a second proclamation permitting the followers   to establish  a    new church. Therefore,  their fore-fathers  were associated with Kundara Old  Church now called  `Valiapaly'.  According  to them, this  church  was  established  as Athanasius  denied spiritual supremacy  of Antioch.  However, it  is not denied that once  ex-communication of Gheevarghese was cancelled in 1912 and  when I. Ibrahim Kathanan, the priest of the Church died his  son Fr.  J. Abrahim  was  ordained  as  priest  by Gheevarghese Dionysius, the Metropolitan  of Malankara. The claim of  Kothamangalam Church was that  it was  only  an Archdiocese  of  the  Syrian  Orthodox  Church  under  the Patriarch  of Antioch which is administered by its Parishioners according to congregational principles of governance and its administration is carried on in accordance with its Constitution which provided for Edavaka Yogam, a managing committee, a working committee and Thonnanda Kaikors.  In the appeal filed by the five churches established during 1951-56 it was claimed that when Catholicos were declared as aliens to the church by  the Travancore High Court, they established the church under the Patriarch of  Antioch. They claimed that they have their own Constitution and mode of administration. They are registered under  the   Societies     Registration   Act   to      whom the Constitution of  Sabha was  never made applicable. According to them,  they having  been established  exclusively by  the Patriarch Group,  there can presumably be no doubt as to the object of  its foundation  and its  basic faith.  In the SLP filed by the Catholicos against the Evangelistic Association referred  as  `Samajam' and  `Simhasana  Churches',  it  is claimed that  the object  of  the  Evangelistic Association indicates  that it  is composed of the members  of the Malankara Church and it provided that any person holding the faith of  the Jacobite Syrian Church  and acknowledging the authority  of that  church   can  be     a  member  of  that Association. It  was claimed  that even though Samajam  is registered under  the Societies Registration  Act,  but  it being established  in the  territorial jurisdiction  of           the Catholicos and having acknowledged the spiritual headship of the Patriarch of Antioch as a supreme patron of the Samajam, they too  should be treated as a part of Malankara Church. It was ponited out that in 1966 the Samajam amended Clauses 7 and 9 of its regulations and Rules and incorporated in Clause 7 (a) and (b), but their claim was rejected by the Division Bench as this amendment was subsequently withdrawn. In  respect   of  the   Simhasana Churches, it was claimed that they were established with the object of  seeking grace  from   Patriarch  of  Antioch    and, therefore, they too should be deemed to be part of Malankara Church.

Since the     basic controversy  is the  same and both the learned Single   Judge and  the Division Bench have recorded the finding  for or  against the  catholicos in respect  of different churches  after considering the material on record in  each  case    and  with  full understanding  and  correct appreciation of law it is not necessary to deal with them in any detail  except to  hold that  they do  not call  for any interference. Suffice  it to  say that         the parishes are the churches which cannot claim  to be  separate or  autonomous bodies only  because their  racial and     cultural origin    was different. Once they were established whether they came from outside or  they were  local persons  it did  not make    any difference as after the establishment of the church with the permission  of   the Government           and  the  Metropolitan  and acknowledging the spiritual headship of Patriarch of Antioch which follows  the apostolic succession, the nature of these churches was  episcopal and,  therefore, it  was not open to them to claim that  they should  be treated  as  autonomous bodies merely  because they have their separate bye-laws. As stated earlier,    the framing  of the bye-laws in each church is necessary  for purposes of governance and administration. But once  a church is established then the property vests in the  endowment and  it becomes a public charity, the administration and control of which has  to be governed in accordance with the objective of the endowment. Since the objective is to follow Syrian Orthodox Church of which Patriarch of  Antioch is  the head,  they cannot claim to be independent, especially after the  Constitution of 1934 was framed.

What remains  to be dealt with is the argument advanced by Ms. Lily Thomas, the learned counsel for intervener that the Patriarch  of Antioch being corporation sole his powers, spiritual or  temporal were not partible nor the integrality can be  split up.  Reliance was placed on paragraph 1206 of Halsbury's Laws of England  Vol. 9  and General Assembly of Free Church  of Scotland  & others etc. V. Lord Overtoun and others etc.  1904 Appeal Cases 515. The characteristics of a corporation sole  which was,  `originally ecclesiastical for the most part' is, `that its identity is continuous, that is that the  original  member  or members and  his  or  their successors are one' [Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 9 paras 1207-1208].  But  does it  help? The personality of the Patriarch is not being split. His integrality is not being destroyed. He  remains the spiritual head. The difference in degree of  exercise of spirituality does not detract his status from  being corporation sole. The mere fact that it has been  reduced to `vanishing point' does not mean that he has ceased  to be  so.  In  fact much  sensitivity  has been generated for nothing.  The Patriarch of Antioch and Catholicate always  existed in the  hierarchy as the two dignitaries. `This dignitary (Patriarch) usually resides in a monastery  near Mardin.  The second dignitary, the primate of Tagrit,  resides near  Mosul, and  is termed    Maphrida or fruit-bearer' [Faiths  of  the        World  Vol.II  p.  195].  In General Assembly  of Free  Church (supra) what was held that nature of  public trust    cannot be  changed.  Has  it    been changed by the Catholicate?  The answer  has to  be in the negative. Even  the first  clause of the Constitution framed in 1934 acknowledge the supremacy of the patriarch.

The conclusions thus reached are,

1

(a) The civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suits for  violation of      fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25  and 26  of the Constitution of India and suits.

(b) The  expression 'civil nature' used in Section 9 of the  Civil   Procedure    Code   is  wider   than   even  civil proceedings, and  thus extends  to  such  religious  matters which have civil consequence.

 (c)  Section 9 is very wide. In absence of any ecclesiastical courts  any religious dispute is congnizable, except in  very rare  cases where the declaration sought may be what constitutes religious rite.

2. Places of  Worship (Special  Provisions) Act,  1991 does not debar those  cases where  declaration is sought for a period prior to the Act came into force or for enforcement of right which was recognised before coming into force of the Act.

3. The  following findings  in Moran  Mar Basselious (supra) have become final and operate as resjudicata:-

     (a).  The Catholicate  of  the  East  was  created  in Malankara in 1912.

     (b). The  Constitution  framed  in 1934  by  Malankara Association is valid.

     (c). The  Catholicos were not heretics  nor  they had established separate  church.

     (d). The  meeting held  by Patriarch  Group in 1935 was invalid.

4  

 (a). The  effect of  the two  judgments rendered by the Appellate  Court  of  the  Royal  Court  and  in  Moran Mar Basselios (supra)  by this Court is that both Catholicos and Patriarch  Group continue to be members of the Syrian Orthodox church.

(b) The  Patriarch of  Antioch has no temporal  powers over the churches.

(c) Effect of the creation of Catholicate at Malankara and 1934  Constitution is  that the  patriarch can  exercise spiritual powers subject to the Constitution.

(d) The  spiritual powers of the atriarch of Antioch can be  exercised by  the   Catholico in accordance with the Constitution.

5.  

(a) The  Hudaya Canon  produced by the Patriarch is not the authentic version.

(b) There is no power in the Hudaya Canon to ex- communicate Catholicos.

6. The  ex-communication of  the Catholicos by the Patriarch was invalid.

7. All  churches, except  those which  are  of   Evangelistic Association or  Simhasna or St. Mary are under spiritual and temporal control  of the Malankara Association in accordance with 1934 Constitution..

Legal issues  of jurisdiction,  maintainability of the suits, ex-communication of the Catholico, authenticity  of the canon,  res judicata  of the  findings recorded  in the Samudayam Suit,  relationship of  Malankara Association with Parish Churches having been  resolved not  much  difficulty remains in  the manner   in which  these appeals  should  be decided. But  before doing  so the  stage is  also ripe for recording the  deep anguish on baffling tenacity, to  fight till finish, between two groups, rather, members of the same family of a community which is, a living tradition of  faith  and  culture'  which  teaches  honesty, simplicity and    above all  sacrifice. What is astonishing is that the  two groups have had several rounds of bouts in the courts, where  mass evidence  both oral and documentary was led  not   on  ideological   clash,  religious difference, theological  conflict or  any  scriptural dispute or controversy about the  right of  worship, rituals and ceremonies or belief and faith surfaced but on matters which appear to  be extraneous  to  establishment  of   the  Syrian church a  religious institution which has a glorious history and proud  record of service. Mr. Parasaran was justified in submitting that   Syrian churches  could not  be  thought  of without   Patriarch of     Antioch. But  where is   the  dispute about it.  Even the  Catholicos acknowledge  that he  is the highest spiritual head. Extent of his powers and prerogative and  not  the  existence  or  his  being  highest  spiritual authority was  disputed. Therefore,  in nutshell  the entire exercise was  much ado about nothing. If the Catholicos went to one   extreme and  claimed that  a declaration  be granted that the  Church had become autocephalous then the Patriarch went to other   extreme  by  raising  all  possible  defence denying even  the most basic  and fundamental concepts which had  been   settled  either  by  judicial  decision  or  the Constitution and  Kalpanas issued  from time  to time.    Even when Patriarch  of Antioch was constituted in the meeting of Nicea held  in 325 A.D. the other higher spiritual authority was the Catholico of  the East.  It was agreed even at that time  that  the  Catholico  could  perform  every  spiritual function but  the Patriarch  had  the  overall superiority. There is no deviation from that, except to the extent it is provided in  the Constitution  with consent  of all and  in accordance  with  the convention   and  custom  which has developed for  all these  long years. Therefore, in order to bring down  the curtain  and avoid any future digging of the grave activated by personal  prejudices and  rivalry, it is necessary to  hold that  the Constitution of 1934 as amended from time  to time accepted and acted upon till the spurt of activities in  1970 shall  be taken  as final, governing the right and relationship of all the parties.

When hearing  of these  appeals commenced it was   felt both at  the outset  and in  the midst that if both parties agreed, the  dispute could  be referred to some high-powered committee of  religious authorities.  But probably the issue being less religious and more legalistic and technical, both the parties through their counsel reposed confidence in this Court and  entreated the  Bench to  bring  an  end  to this litigation. Therefore, now after dealing with various legal matters which  could not  have probably been satisfactorily resolved it is appropriate to declare that,

(1) Relationship  between the  two spiritual superiors, that is, the   patriarch of  Antioch and Catholico of the East at Malankara is  neither of superior nor subordiante but of two independent   spiritual authorities  with Patriarch  at the highest in the hierarchy

(2) The Catholicos and the  Patriarch are declared as followers of one creed, namely, Syrian  Orthodox Church.

(3) The Constitution framed by the Malankara Association as amended from time to time shall govern the Churches attached to the Malankara Association.

Before  concluding it  may  be  observed  that  while highlighting the  relationship between Malankara Association and the Parish Churches,  it was submitted by Mr. Parasaran that the provisions in  the Constitution  permitting  every church to  send same  number of representatives irrespective of the strength of  churches was not very fair. May be. But this  is  a provision  governing  matters  not  only  of administration of  churches but  of faith  and religion.  The Malankara Association is like the executive of the Malankara Church to  exercise  control  over  religion  and  temporal matters. The  Courts' function    is restricted  to ensure its proper implementation  and  not to determine whether  the provisions in  the Constitution framed by the religious body was fair  or unfair.  Religion is not governed, necessarily, by logic.  In any  case, it  is not in the domain of secular courts to  substitute its  own opinion of fairness. Further, no foundation  was laid for it either in the pleading in the trial court  or in  the SLPs  filed in this Court  nor  any argument appears  to have  been advanced  either before  the Single Judge  or the Division Bench. In fact, if the figures given in  the Encyclopedia of Religion is any guide then the numerical strength of Catholicos  in 1970 was more than the Patriarch.  However   paragraphs  120  and 121 of the Constitution of  1934 provide  for a  Rule Commitee which is empowered to  amend the Constitution from time to time. The grievance, therefore  of fair representation, if it has any substance, can be raised before the Committee.

In a  separate  judgment   written  by  Brother  Jeevan Reddy,J.  he  has agreed,  although for  different  reasons, that the  creation of catholicate in 1912 was valid and that the Constitution framed in 1934 was binding and it

Source: http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=10730

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